


JPRS-USS-91-002  
10 JANUARY 1991



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

---

# ***JPRS Report***

# **Soviet Union**

---

***SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES***

No 9, September 1990

# Soviet Union

## SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 9, September 1990

JPRS-USS-91-002

### CONTENTS

10 January 1991

[Selected translations from the Russian-language monthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

The Involvement Principle (Sociopolitical Context) [S.A. Efirov] .....	1
Political Sociology: State, Problems, Prospects [Zh.T. Toshchenko, V.E. Boykov] .....	5
The Social Problem of Moral Preparation for Family Life: The Role of Ethnic Pedagogics (From Ukrainian Material) [M.I. Stelmakhovich] .....	9
The Large Urban Family [Ye.F. Achildiyeva] .....	17
Drugs Among the Student Youth [A.A. Gabiani] .....	22
Organized Juvenile Crime [B.Ya. Petelin] .....	27
Education and Life Expectancy of Urban Dwellers of Kazakhstan [D.Z. Borkhov] .....	32
The Concept of Recreation Sociology [A.S. Orlov] .....	33
The Protest Camp at Project 1212 [O.A. Meleshkina, et al.] .....	36
Waiting for Work at Home [S.G. Ibragimova] .....	39
Articles Not Translated .....	40
Publication Data [p 160] .....	41



## SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 9, September 1990

### The Involvement Principle (Sociopolitical Context)

915D0003A Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 90 (signed to  
press 6 Aug 90) pp 14-21

[Article by Svetozar Aleksandrovich Efirov, head science associate at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, doctor of philosophical sciences and professor. He is the author of a number of monographs including "Pokusheniye na budushcheye. Logika i futurologiya 'levogo ekstremizma'" [Assault on the Future. The Logic and Futurology of "Leftist Extremism"] (1984) and "'Levyi' terrorizm na Zapade: istoriya i sovremennost'" ["Leftist" Terrorism in the West: History and Modern Times] (1987, co-author). He is a permanent contributor to our journal]

### Totalitarianism and Pseudoinvolvement

[Text] The linkage between the involvement of the workers in solving production and social problems at enterprises and the nature of the sociopolitical systems is far from uniform even in those regimes which would seemingly absolutely exclude democratic principles on any level. This applies in particular to totalitarian regimes which endeavor to establish control over all spheres of human life, and drive out any manifestations of independence and any self-managing initiatives. But since such regimes, and not only leftist but often also rightist ones, declare themselves to be popular and even truly popular, they are obliged to declare extensive popular involvement in social, state and production affairs and assert that only they realize true democracy and that the people, the workers and the production collectives are the real masters in the political and production spheres.

Such declarations have not always been hypocritical. The leaders and the ruling elite in certain totalitarian regimes, particularly during the first period of their existence, have sincerely endeavored to encourage civil and production initiative, and have proposed slogans for production self-management, believing in the universal popular support of their policy and that such initiatives will flow naturally and spontaneously in the channel of the official line. When this condition is unrealized, the situation gradually moves under the sway of repressive and propagandistic machines. The various forms of political, social and production involvement assume an evermore decorative nature. A multiplicity of stage-prop social, state and production bodies, official "popular" measures and show and production campaigns arise and these should seem to come from below. The propaganda picture created by the mass information media gradually loses touch with reality. The newspapers and radio broadcasts are full of stories about democracy and about

the workers as the true masters of the means of production, of the growing labor and civil activeness of the workers and kolkhoz members, as well as numerous "labor feats," about worker control of the administration and so forth. Reality is far removed from this rhetoric and the more idyllic the picture becomes for worker involvement in the management of social and production affairs, the less the workers actually participate in them. The worker collectives lose the last vestiges of influence at the enterprises and the party and trade union organizations completely become the "drive belts" for the authority of the superior nomenklatura elite. Regardless of the loud slogans and speeches, as well as the numerous pompous measures of the local and national scale (congresses, rallies, conferences, meetings between the workers and the leadership, rote speeches by specially selected representatives of the workers and peasants and so forth) which should demonstrate the unprecedented activeness of the masses of people, their initiative, involvement in the management of industry and agriculture, any real manifestations of such involvement are decisively thwarted, frequently with completely illegal, repressive methods.

However, regardless of this, the term "pseudoinvolvement" in terms of our recent situation can be used only with certain stipulations. The problem is that in the mass mind, due to the enormous inertia of revolutionary enthusiasm, belief in socialist ideals and the systematic effect of propaganda, for a long time there has been the widespread conviction that in the nation a superior form of democracy has actually been realized on all levels. For this reason, in the pseudodemocratic bodies and initiatives many have participated, as they say, not out of fear but out of conscience. In this sense, it can be said that the principle of involvement in the political, social and production sphere has been realized, although, of course, this realization has been distorted and illusory. People at times have eradicated and suppressed democracy with great enthusiasm, believing sincerely that they were participants in a great undertaking and that their activities realized the superior democratic principles. In the world of slogans and ideological myths, the problem of involvement was considered solved and there was "iron" certainty that this solution was final, superior and unique.

To a greater or lesser degree such a situation has been characteristic of all the leftist totalitarian regimes. One of the recent examples of Romania. Some 20 years ago, production self-management here became one of the leitmotifs in the official ideology and propaganda. A number of decrees and laws was passed on this matter and the appropriate bodies were set up (initially administrative committees at the enterprises, then worker councils which were proclaimed to be the superior form of collective management of the enterprises, the National Worker Council for coordinating their activities and so forth). However, in actuality the functions of the production self-management bodies, regardless of the widespread advertising, came down to the search for



the optimum ways for carrying out the guiding decrees and instructions. The workers selected to participate in them were turned into functionaries who obediently carried out the will of the leadership. Attempts to establish independent trade unions were decisively checked and the very idea was viewed as reactionary and serving the interests of imperialism. The production self-management bodies in essence were absolutely without rights, the enterprises were completely subordinate to the centralized administrative-bureaucratic system and the workers were under rigid control by the authorities.

The situation which has existed in the rightist totalitarian regimes is largely analogous, since in their nature leftist and rightist totalitarianism is very close. In truth, this closeness is rather more social and political than it is economic. Rightist totalitarianism, as a rule, does not destroy a market economy, and it maintains an economic self-regulation which makes it possible for the economy to remain efficient. However, the trade unions and the production democracy bodies, if they have survived, here also become means of manipulation in the hands of the political and industrial elite. Populist demagoguery and false involvement in production management exist here as well, however hypocrisy usually is still less.

The real involvement of the workers in management on production and all other levels in totalitarian systems is impossible precisely because, contrary to the declarations, in them everything is subordinate to the interests of the ruling elite. It is a question of harshly defended interests close to class ones, as this elite in the totalitarian states gravitates toward being converted into a hereditary caste with special features such as exclusiveness, a low level of social mobility (it is difficult to get into this social group but no less difficult to "fall out of it"), a tendency to turn one's status into a hereditary one, a multiplicity of special rights and privileges and so forth. In societies where a mechanism of the "circulation of elites" exists, these traits simply cannot develop.

The status and privileges of this group are threatened precisely by all forms of democracy and, in particular, production democracy, as well as by the independent and self-managing initiatives of the workers as these entail over the long run the rotating of management personnel, democratic control of them, a heightened degree of social mobility and the triumph of meritocratic principles which are dangerous for any exclusive caste.

In recent years, our nation has also encountered such problems. The fate of the economic reform and all perestroika depends largely upon the nature of resolving the contradictions between the still strong ruling elite and its apparatus and the new democratic bodies and movements. The nomenklatura bureaucracy is perfectly aware that consistent democratization on all levels inevitably undermines the bases of its power, status and privileges, its existence becomes unnecessary and there is nothing to rule. But it also realizes that it is impossible to remain in the former situation. To carry out the reform

to its conclusion would mean to lose everything, but not to carry it out at all also would be to suffer a defeat. Hence, the half-heartedness of the reforms in the political, economic and production spheres. Hence, the large number of obstacles on the path to the real independence of the enterprises and businesses in the city and countryside (city cooperative and individual entrepreneurship, farms, true voluntary cooperation in the countryside and so forth).

For restraining economic democratization, the real difficulties and problems are being utilized and which inevitably arise in introducing alien elements even into a disintegrating totalitarian system. When, under the conditions of economic monopoly, the production collectives gain the right to really influence the production process, product sales, the setting of prices, disposing of a portion of the profit and so forth, this often leads to selfish, local decisions which causes the consumer to suffer. The cooperatives which are artificially incorporated in a monopolistic, marketless economic system which is by nature alien to them, frequently become sociopathological, predatory formations which aggravate the already difficult situation of the public.

Generally, the incorporation of individual competitive, commodity-monetary or self-managing organizations into the command-administrative system inevitably leads either to their alienation or to sociopathological degeneration, exacerbating the over-all disorganization. This actually has been happening in our nation in recent years. The socioeconomic experimentation related to the development of initiative and independence and in particular the introduction of various forms of worker participation and control on the job, can be constructive only on a natural grounds, on the grounds of a socially regulated system of a "mixed economy."

This system also differs from the artificial incorporation of alien elements of a market economy and production democracy into a regime of state monopoly in the fact that with the presence of a significant degree of social and state control and "involvement" the mechanisms of socioeconomic self-regulation are preserved or restored, monopolies disappear and social, economic and political democracy becomes possible, organic and even necessary. In realizing all of this, there must be the consistent and not half-hearted restoring of the socioeconomic institutions and mechanisms which have come into being over the decades and centuries in the developed nations such as, for example, socially regulated private property, competition, and a market which have proven their effectiveness as well as their humanistic potential.

### Political and Production Democracy

The linkage between political democracy and production democracy occurs and becomes apparent far from simultaneously. The former creates the prerequisites and possibilities for the development of the latter, however they are realized only when the policy of the developed democratic nations assumes an organic and permanent

social orientation, although even in this period the Western industrial states at times continue to hold negative or neutral positions in relation to production democracy. In essence, the production "involvement" within the democratic systems becomes real when an industrial society after the phases of "classic" and monopolistic capitalism, enters the social phase of development marked by a high degree of state and public regulation, by a social focus to policy, by the broad development and spread of all sorts of social programs, initiatives and guarantees, by a high degree of social protection, by a high level and quality of life and so forth.

However, the first steps of production democracy go back, of course, to a much earlier time and it would be difficult to even say to which. Much depends upon the very understanding of this term, that is, to interpret it in a broad or narrow sense, should one relate to its development the trade union, cooperative, production-community and other movements, should the rise of production democracy be linked to the first steps of its contractual institutionalization, to the first enactments of legislative reinforcement or to something else. Depending upon this, one can say that 1891 was the starting point when Germany for the first time adopted a law on worker councils or 1791, when the first cooperative enterprise was established in the United States or, possibly, even earlier times. In one way or another, let us not be distracted by the confusion of definitions but let us agree to view production democracy primarily as worker involvement in the resolving of production and social problems at the enterprise. The historical aspect of the question goes also beyond the limits of the tasks of the current article which merely endeavors to establish the linkage of the various forms of production participation with the different political systems.

Such forms arose for the first time in Europe on the crest of the revolutionary upswing at the end of the first decade of our century. This first wave was of short duration and was nullified in the second half of the 1920s. However, it was an important stage and symptom, it involved a number of European nations, it gave rise to or reinforced the basic structural elements of production democracy (worker councils and so forth), and was given legislative reinforcement in certain nations and a contractual framework in others. For example, in Germany and Austria this already had a legislative basis while in England and Italy it existed "de facto."

The end of the first wave of production democracy was very symptomatic. In the countries where fascist and military-police regimes were established, this was violently stopped (Italy, Germany, Poland and Hungary) or to one degree and form or another was replaced by various forms of "pseudoinvolvement," while in the democratic countries it was temporarily nullified. The socioeconomic and political grounds did not yet exist for its stable existence and systematic development. An industrial society had not yet become a "social" society

while production democracy had not been turned into an inseparable organic part of it. It became this only after World War II, when the practice of production democracy assumed a systematic and ongoing nature.

It would scarcely be beneficial to attempt to establish a uniform causal relation between the modern forms of political democracy and production democracy. These are inseparable elements of a single whole which arose as a result of the mass social movements and the essential transformation of the capitalist system. Usually, three levels of worker involvement are distinguished in the taking of managerial decisions: 1) consultation; 2) codetermination (the voice of the workers assumes an importance commensurable with the voice of the managers); 3) controlling (a stage which as yet is rather the exception than the rule and causes, it should be said, a number of doubts from the viewpoint of the socioeconomic effectiveness of production as will be pointed out below).

At times, in analyzing the production involvement of the workers, it is viewed from a different standpoint. Here the following basic parameters are focused on: 1) the degree of worker involvement in each taken management decision, that is, what is reflected in the previous classification; 2) the spheres to which participation is extended (for instance, just social problems, the problems of hiring and firing, professional training, independence, the wage conditions and humanization of labor, safety procedures, the protecting of health, ecology, spiritual needs and so forth or also the problems of production strategy and capital investment strategy, supervision of profits, production modernization, the modernization of the production process and so forth); 3) organizational forms in which participation is carried out (production councils, the representation of the labor collectives on supervisory councils, the boards of the companies, general assemblies and so forth).

As a whole, for a majority of the designated parameters over the last 30 years substantial progress has been observed. The legislation or contractual practices have been improved and broadened, the degree of worker involvement in management has risen, the range of their powers and functions in talks has been broadened as well as participation in the various bodies of the companies and the greater importance of production councils. Incidentally, there are great differences by country.

As in the 1920s, in certain countries production democracy has developed on a legislative basis (Germany, Austria, France and the Scandinavian nations) and in others on a contractual basis (England, Italy). The scale and form of the development of the worker and trade union movements in the specific nation have also played a substantial role in the overall dynamics of production democracy. Also of enormous significance has been the balance of forces between Social Democracy and the conservatives (or the liberals and the conservatives). Beginning in the 1960s, production democracy has become one of the main strategic principles in European

Social Democracy and this at times is viewed as the high road for altering the nature of capitalist society.

In those nations where the Social Democratic traditions are virtually absent, for example, in the United States or where the conservatives have been constantly in power for an extended time as is the case in England, production democracy has not undergone, as a rule, any particular development. However, certain conservative principles such as "relying on one's own forces," "self-help" and so forth do lead to the encouragement of self-managing initiatives by the workers. Thus, in the United States, encouragement has been given for the workers to buy out low-profit or closing enterprises and for this special administrative bodies have been set up on the federal level and the appropriate laws promulgated. Specific self-management forms also exist in England, for example, the institution of shop stewards.

In speaking about the development of production democracy in a modern industrial society, it is essential to bear in mind constantly certain related "internal problems" and primarily the problem of combining social control and the professionalism of management. The Western literature at times employs the term "surplus involvement" meaning a degree of worker participation in management which reduces production efficiency, its competitiveness and substantially delays or even makes impossible the taking of the necessary decisions due to too frequent interference into the management process, excessive fussing with it and protracted discussion. In such instances the production democracy bodies themselves limit the degree of interference into the taking of management decisions. From the viewpoint of maximum economic and social effectiveness and, certainly, ultimately the interests of the labor collective itself, there is a certain optimum balance between managerial and public control and this, of course, can change depending upon the specific forms of production, the circumstances of time and place, the degree of competence of both sides and so forth.

In one way or another, the old and difficult dilemma of democracy and professionalism in management should be constantly taken into attention when it is a question of the economic and other forms of democracy. Recently we have also constantly encountered such difficulties. For example, the idea of abandoning the electing of the administration in state enterprises and institutions arose when it turned out that in the elections of administration the labor collectives very frequently prefer not competence and organizational talents of the candidates but rather follow convenience, advantage, emotional and clan preferences.

The problem of production democracy depends largely upon the nature of the political systems in which the economy functions. For its real and not "sham" realization, production participation can be based upon the main components of sociopolitical democracy including freedom of speech, assembly and criticism, the possibility of disputing the decisions of superior levels, in a

word, upon a firmly guaranteed system of human rights. Totalitarian systems which claim—in any event, in the leftist version—a final and "solely real" solution to the problems of democracy on all levels, in actuality completely prevent this, in replacing actual forms of worker involvement in state management and in production management with various forms of pseudoinvolvement, sometimes extensive and widely publicized. Democratic systems, in not claiming anything and at times even relating negatively to production democracy, not only create favorable forms for the unleashing and improving of its optimum forms, but include production democracy as an essential and organic element of their development, an element without which it is impossible to imagine the normal existence and flourishing of these systems.

### Scenarios of Future Development

The future of production democracy, like its past, undoubtedly is greatly linked to the nature of the political systems. Clearly, at least three futurological scenarios are probable. In the event of the survival, improvement and universalization of the current forms of representative democracy and the ubiquitous spread of the socially controlled system of a "mixed economy," probably there will be a process of the further broadening and optimization of the production democracy forms, and the movement toward a harmonious combination of social control with competent and effective management. Much will depend, of course, not only upon the sociopolitical factors but also upon the technological ones which are hard to predict, as it is very probable that future technologies will become more paradoxical. The problem of involvement—in any event in its current forms—can be eliminated due to a fundamental change in the role and nature of labor, due to ever-greater automatization and the robotization of production, the development of computer "at-home employment" and other currently unknown forms of equipment and production. These forms can eliminate not only the alternative of competence and democracy but even lead to the disappearance of such social groups as the labor collective. It is not to be excluded that due to all of this the problem of production involvement will retreat more and more into the background, in being replaced by the problem of "leisure involvement" and participation in creative nonproduction activities and this, in turn, can be eliminated as it becomes a natural vital mode.

The essential role of the given factors inevitably will grow with the realization of another futurological scenario, the alternative one. The self-managing communes and communities, the prevalence of small-scale but highly efficient production linked to microcomputer technology and other innovations, and a life based on the principles of the harmony of man and man and man and nature—if such a future is not an utopia, in essence the problem of participation in it will cease to exist, as involvement on all levels becomes universal and natural. Generally, the alternative movements with all their contradictoriness even now in certain areas demonstrate



a tendency toward universalization and thereby the elimination of the problem of participation. Of undoubted interest on this level are the alternative enterprises in a number of Western nations, and primarily the cooperatives or the worker-purchased, certain agricultural communes and so forth.

Incidentally, alternativism, like the paradoxical technologies of the future, can be a base not only for higher forms of liberation and democratization, but also hitherto unprecedented forms of totalitarian systems related to universal control of thoughts and behavior. Certain researchers of the alternative movements have stated that the communitarian self-managing initiatives frequently demonstrate a gravitation to the rebirth of what initially was categorically denied, that is, hierarchy, authoritarianism and one-man dictatorship. In essence, such a transformation is natural, and it is with good reason that up to now all socioeconomic forms which have repudiated the competitive idea have always led to command-administrative methods of management, since the principle of spontaneous social movement was excluded and for this in history as yet no other alternative has been found except for authoritarianism. Many communitarian projects show a constant gravitation to precisely such a conclusion. These projects can, contrary to the plans and expectations, lead to the rebirth of rigid forms of totalitarianism and certainly not to the natural elimination of the problem of involvement but rather to its new replacement by fiat.

Precisely this is the third futurological scenario. In considering the trends of sociopolitical development in the modern world, it is improbable but the possibility of it must not be fully discarded. All the more as the danger of universal computer totalitarianism is comparable in its scale and probable consequences with the severest global disasters which threaten mankind. In the event of its realization there is a possibility of such an all-encompassing suppression of all forms of democracy and human freedom and not even their sham, hypocritical forms may be needed which are designed for deceiving and preventing protests. With absolute control over the thoughts and actions of people, this can be completely superfluous.

It is difficult to say from whence the threat of new totalitarianism can derive. In a whole series of nations there are rightist radical movements, parties and organizations (the National Front in France, the Republican Party in Germany, the Islamic fundamentalist organizations and so forth) the influence of which in some places is markedly growing. The nations with leftist totalitarian regimes and leftist totalitarian movements also survive in the world, although they are living through a profound crisis. A threat—and possibly the most dangerous one—can derive from our nation. Everything will depend upon the outcome of perestroika: whether it will be possible to have a transition to a multiparty democratic system and a system of a socially regulated "mixed" economy or the conservative forces can seek revenge. The fate of production democracy in our nation to a decisive degree will

depend upon the consistency in carrying out the economic and political reforms. If a policy of half-measures leads to a socioeconomic collapse or even conservative forces come to power (the latter can fully be a consequence of the former), "involvement" on all levels will be blocked and the rote and pseudodemocratic declarations concealing authoritarian dictatorship will move to the forefront. If the nation is able to shift to a "mixed economy" and consistent democracy, then real production participation can rise to the level of those states where it has undergone greatest development, particularly as in this instance the collective forms of ownership will play a very significant role in economic life.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya", 1990.

### Political Sociology: State, Problems, Prospects

915D0003B Moscow SOTSILOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 90 (signed to  
press 6 Aug 90) pp 22-28

[Article by Zhan Teretyevich Toshchenko, director of the Sociological Research Center, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor and Vladimir Erikovich Boykov, deputy director of the Sociological Research Center, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor]

[Text] **Positing of the problem.** The realization of democratization and the mastery of the new approaches and methods in governing life at present necessitate research on the nature and mechanisms for the functioning of rule by the people, political institutions, relations, political culture as well as the political system as a whole. Without such research, at present it is impossible to have an optimum solution to the strategic and current political tasks. It is precisely in this context that political sociology emerges in the forefront.

In the West, it has assumed relative independence and has been developing now for over a half century. The works of T. Parsons, G. Rostow, R. Mills, G. Polswell, D. Bell, R. Michels and S. Lipset have analyzed in detail the problems of bureaucracy, elites, political parties and pressure groups. Along with scholarly examinations, the practical aspect of the question has also developed actively.

In our nation research within the area of political sociology has also been conducted for some time. This includes the study of the state of the political awareness of the population, the sociopolitical activeness of the Soviet people, the activities of state institutions, party and Komsomol organizations. However, in the first place, many areas of political life until very recently have remained a scientific virgin land. Secondly, the research has basically been of an apologetic nature, not going beyond the limits of illustrating the "political unity of the Soviet people," "the dominance of the socialist ideology," "the growing role of the party" and other similar views.

The one-sidedness of the research to a significant degree has been explained by the actual political situation as well as by the fact that the sphere of this research has been a field of acute ideological confrontation with Western colleagues. The latter circumstance has given rise to the hyperbolization of the principle of the party approach in sociology and the discrepancy between the research and scientific objectivity. The notion of a class approach and theoretical and methodological strictness have been identified with the direct dependence of the scientists upon the authorities, upon the administrative-command system and ideological taboos.

In order to more clearly sketch in the circle of designated problems, we must first of all review the question of the subject of political sociology.

**The subject of research.** The necessity of clarifying the subject is confirmed by the fact that along with the designated concept, extensive use is also made of such terms as "political science," "politology," "the philosophy of politics," "the sociology of politics" and so forth.

As for the first aspect, the relationship with "political sciences" and "politology," in the context of their constructing and official recognition within Soviet social sciences, attention must be drawn to precisely what is the object of research in these sciences. Political science views political life in all its diverse manifestations, beginning with the essence of power and its nature and ending with the specific forms of its manifestation and institutional embodiment.

The research of G.A. Arbatov, F.M. Burlatskiy, Yu.A. Zamoshkin, Yu.A. Krasin, N.M. Keyzerov, G.Kh. Shakhnazarov and others have established the bases of politology [political science] and which has developed up to now in being closely interlinked with the sociological problems of political relations. This has led to a situation where the differences between the related sciences have been so insignificant that they, in our view, have wrongly been considered identical.

At the same time, there are differences. The main object of sociology is civil society. But political sociology examines the attitude of society to the state and the institutions for the distribution and formation of power manifested primarily in the focus of political awareness and conduct. This should answer the question of how the individual, social groups and strata, parties and social organizations understand the existing political reality, the system of power relationships, their rights and freedoms.

On the other hand, there is the acute question of the demarcation and clarification of the relation of political sociology with another concept of "the sociology of politics." In a majority of instances, by this one understands a relatively independent branch of sociology within which the following are studied: the interrelation of political spheres and institutions, the development of the political structure of society; the forms of sociopolitical activity (and activeness); public opinion expressing

political ideas, the orientation of individuals and groups; the place of parties in the system of power. The task of the sociology of politics is a concrete analysis of the content of politics and political activity by various social groups, investigating the nature of their political interests and corresponding relations, the content of the activity of the political institutions, as well as studying political movements, the behavior and awareness of the masses.

However, the term "sociology of politics" is not the most successful. It entails the danger of an excessively broadened interpretation of the subject and sphere of research of this area in sociological science. In actuality, to one degree or another political control is present in all spheres of life. Of course, under certain circumstances even individual social phenomena can be at the center of political life and cause even strikes, entail the retirement or change of the representatives of power and other such consequences. Nevertheless, the sources of these phenomena and the mechanisms of development are linked to the functioning of the economic, social and spiritual spheres. The influence on them is carried out with the aid of scientific-technical, economic, social, agrarian, demographic, nationality and cultural policy. To a certain degree corresponding to these areas are the different sectors and branches of sociology: economic, labor, town and country, culture and art, ethnosociology and so forth.

Proceeding from what has been said, the concept of "political sociology" in relation to an analysis of political life is more preferable than is the "sociology of politics." It is aimed at studying the essence of the problems of power, rights and liberties from the viewpoint of the specific person as well as social groups, strata, social organizations and associations. In other words, we approach an analysis of political sociology from the viewpoint of the individual, man as a member of civil society.

For precisely this reason, for political sociology a subject of particular importance is an examination of the individual as a principal of political life. The necessity of such an approach is caused by the fact that each person in any society, including a socialist one, is not only an object but also a principal [subject] of political relations.

Politics has long become the domain of the majority. The understanding and realization of human rights and freedoms have created a basis for the participation of all without exception in the development and improvement of political relations. No matter how significant the role of the leader of any rank or any area, the conduct of people in the sphere of politics ultimately always remains decisive. K. Marx rightly linked the process of the emancipation of man with an awareness on the part of each individual of his social force as a political force. And this awareness shows a tendency for constant growth and this is manifested in the broader involvement of the citizens in resolving the fate of their nation and events of an international nature.

It can be concluded that the content of political life is a particular form of the realization of the interests of peoples, classes, nations and the parties and associations representing them in the conscious use of the levers of power.

It is precisely with such an approach that one can see the contradictoriness of the various structures in political life. If the claims of a class or group directed by the parties take into account the objective course of the historical process, then the political relations in the given sociopolitical system develop without social clashes. The less the interests of various groups coincide with the objective patterns of social development, the greater the probability of collisions and political conflicts and contradictions (even up to a revolution as a method of resolving this contradiction).

Thus, the political awareness and conduct of people operate as the subject of political sociology and these are embodied in the activities of the state and social institutions and organizations as well as the mechanisms of effecting the processes of the functioning of power.

**The structure of political sociology.** The question of power and its utilization comprises the essential base of political life. From the sociological viewpoint, in this context of interest, in the first place, are the activities of the state and the parties, institutions and organizations embodying its political essence, secondly, the social and voluntary associations and organizations which partially carry out political functions and, finally, the degree of involvement of the social strata, groups and each individual in political life.

Initially, many problems of political life were studied by political sciences. And only since the 1950s, when these came into contact with sociology, did political sociology develop in the structure of the latter [sociology] in the form of a separate branch. This was reflected particularly in the works of A. Gowlman, S. Lipset, T. Parsons and A. Alter.

In the structure of political sociology, a significant place is held by research on the problems of social significance including: the struggle for peace and against the threat of a nuclear war and for realizing the principles of peaceful existence. An analysis of the power relationships would be incomplete without a study and examination of the diverse aspects of international policy as well as foreign political acts carried out by one or another civil society.

**Immediate problems.** When an intensive process of the politization of social life is occurring, the objective need increases significantly for a more profound, thorough scientific analysis of all its aspect and particularly those which have emerged in the forefront in the course of carrying out the new thinking in the sphere of the functioning of political relations. Many scientists—both Soviet and foreign—are giving great attention to the nature of power, the role of the state, to the areas of activity of the formal and informal institutions which claim participation in the taking of political decisions.

If an examination of power is put at the center of political sociology, then first of all attention must be paid to the participation in political life of its agents in the form of the state, the political parties and social organizations. Of important significance in the system of power relationships is the individual problems of bureaucracy, political leadership, the mechanism of exercising power and the shaping of public opinion.

The research has disclosed a growing tension in society. This is manifested primarily in the intensifying criticism of institutions which embody the power relationships of the state, party, Komsomol and trade union organizations, the law enforcement bodies, the ministries and departments. Crisis phenomena are apparent everywhere. Here it is wise to employ the conclusions of management theory according to which with 30 percent of the members of the corresponding organization dissatisfied or critical, a disorganization of the system commences and with 50 percent there is crisis and collapse. In our research the latter indicator has approached 35 percent. Is it possible to mechanically shift these patterns to political life? The political system, in contrast to a technical organizational one, with all the similarity of the external parameters, is subordinate to its own laws and is controlled by a more complex sociopsychological mechanism. We are poorly aware of this, to say the least. Could one have expected the devastating defeat of Churchill and his party in the victorious year of 1945? Or the enormous popularity of Yu. Andropov in an insignificantly short period of time, when essentially nothing had occurred either in the nation or in the party. Only intentions had been voiced and these were not so much in favor of a fundamental renewal of life or the democratization of social institutions as they were in favor of a hardening of discipline and responsibility.

At the same time, it would be absurd to deny the radical changes in the system of political values. This is confirmed by the fact that almost one-third of those questioned stated the loss of belief in the possibility of renewing the party and the winning of vanguard positions by it.

The communists, like all the workers, doubted the advisability of further maintaining Article 6 of the USSR Constitution.

An analysis of the political awareness of the Soviet people indicates that this has incorporated a mass of the most diverse interpretations of the occurring events as well as prejudices and even frightening proposals and forecasts from the collapse of the economy to the possibility of a civil war. A fact which cannot be denied is that there is underway a decisive and rapid breaking up of the stereotypes of millions. Life itself has forced the people to both view, assess and judge in a new light. Even now the ideas are fundamentally changing. For example, possibly the most persistent over many decades have disappeared such as: "We will wait a bit, tighten our belts now and then tomorrow things will be better." or



"Maybe not for us but for our children." Generally, this is the idea of a bright future.... Now there is a clearly expressed pragmatic focus in awareness: here and now! Of course, this greatly complicates the situation but, as they say, that is how things go. Hence, the conclusion that we now have a different type of people. It is important to realize this. And that we can no longer count on returning to the former ideas which were so convenient for the "upper cliques" for manipulation.

It is important for the sociologist to understand along what paths political awareness will develop. It is impossible to assess this on a uniform basis particularly as this is not merely the total of individual consciousnesses. Many reactions of people to various social processes reflect their sociological awareness to a greater degree. Hence, it is more accurate how probably to speak about the mood of people. This varies actually within very significant ranges. And this is not as innocent as may seem at first glance as an attitude is the first element of inducements and behavior motives.

However, we must not overlook the fact that the immediate manifestations of conscience most often reflect precisely attitudes which are extremely variable. This is why the enthusiasm of a demonstrating mass is enticing. Here a particular psychological mechanism is at work which very easily excites any emotions and in skillful hands serves as a fine manipulator.

Moreover, individual regional outbursts and the slogan imperatives of extremes can upset the course of renewal and perestroika. Here at present a multiplicity of problems is brought into focus including political, ideological, socioeconomic and moral.

The research also discloses a rather significant spectrum of political illusions, harebrained plans, the force of so-called pressure groups and attempts to falsify information about real political processes.

At present, the most critically inclined are the intelligentsia followed by the workers of active age (from 30 to 50). The highest level of dissatisfaction is observed among the members of the informal associations. It is important to bear in mind that the polarization of opinions—the number of persons with opposite views is approximately equal—creates conditions for the formation and operation of the pressure groups.

An analysis of the sociological data indicates that regardless of all the diverse excesses and their different assessments, in the public mind centrist tendencies are beginning to dominate, that is, an ever-growing understanding of the need for a balanced policy, and protection from the adventurism and threats of both the right and the left. It is obvious that people have grown tired of mutual insults, offenses and suspicions. Equally obvious is a desire for certainty and stability. Some see in this a manifestation of conservative trends and even a turn to the right. However, many adhere to a different viewpoint. The growing support for the reasonable actions undertaken by the government speaks primarily in favor

of the conclusion of the strengthening of an unique centrist awareness. A nationwide poll in October showed that 53 percent of the workers had high regard for the work of the Supreme Soviet and believed in its forces and abilities. The support for our political leaders—Gorbachev and Ryzhkov—appears rather substantial as their activities are approved by from two-thirds to three-quarters of the respondents. Criticism does not mean disappointment in them or in perestroika. What is particularly important is that such a position is found in virtually all categories—from the miners to the timber workers, from the kolkhoz members to the students.

Research has disclosed one of the most important problems in the present-day political situation—the very critical attitude toward the party. This is a natural and largely regular process. One other stereotype of thought has been activated and that is the party is responsible for everything. Actually responsible. And for the fact that it has allowed such a situation in the nation and for the fact that having declared perestroika to be the only solution to this, has been blocked at the start. One of the reasons for this is the following. It is not so easy to separate out a political organization which has been closely woven into the administrative-command system. It is no accident that there is a growing number of communists who express dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the party. Some 39 percent of the workers have a negative view of the activities of their party organizations and 33 percent have voiced negative views on the authority of the communists.

At the same time, this problem must not be examined one-sidedly. A more profound analysis indicates that the criticism is not so much against the party as against the party apparatus. But in the eyes of millions this is associated with the party itself. Some 56 percent of those polled (69 percent amongst the communists) linked their hopes for a better life to perestroika in the CPSU. At the same time, 54 percent sharply criticized the work of the party apparatus. The communists place even greater demands and 73 percent (!) feel that predominant in the apparatus are workers of mediocre and low ability, without clear individuality, analytical thinking or the gift of persuasion.

According to the data of Sverdlovsk sociologists from the Institute of Philosophy and Law and the Higher Party School in the mass mind there is the dominant notion of a party worker as a "bureaucrat" or "weather vane" and here the opinions of the communists, the Komsomol members and nonparty persons coincide. And a usual replacing of the cadres will not suffice here as the critically inclined respondents state directly. And this makes sense as the more than one-half replaced apparatus continues fervently to reproduce the same type of functionary as well as the old forms and methods of work.

It must be pointed out that at present in political life the greatest tension, as our research shows, has been caused by the delay of the changes in the party and this has

formed the opinion of the reticence of the party workers to mend their ways. The dynamism of party life is at present a major factor in the stabilization of society. If one views things through the prism of the opinions of the communists themselves, then here the solution is as follows: 86 percent of those questioned consider it essential to have a "merciless" (!) purging of the party and the renewal of its ranks. This is a major shift over the last 6 months as in June it was 10 percent. Some 92 percent demand the replacement of the old apparatus and 42 percent of them favor radical measures. This is yet another confirmation that the main reason for the drop in party authority consists in the apparatus structures. The fact of greater criticalness by the communists in assessing the existing situation in comparison with others, particularly when it is a matter of their own role or the influence of the party on economic and social problems, can be judged as a significant shift.

It would be much worse if the reverse happened, that is, the party became frozen in its complacency and ceased to receive any signals whatsoever from outside. This would mean both its moral and physical death.

Particular importance is being assumed by an assessment of the state of the leadership, including the political. Here we encounter many paradoxes. A poll of the new generation of leaders at the nation's enterprises has shown that they have a significantly higher review of the results of perestroika than does the general mass of workers. Why? Because they have made an effort, they have held meetings and have convinced some that progress has been made. But the course of perestroika is assessed not from how the leaders think but rather from the attitude of all the workers to what is happening. And they feel that the changes are much more meager as the difference in the assessment of changes on the job and in everyday life has reached 15-20 points. Has it not been these different interpretations which have led to the situation where the leaders and their subordinates under the conditions of perestroika speak in different tongues, often not understanding one another? Have not these differences been the reason for the exacerbation of relations manifested in the outburst of meetings and the organizing of strikes?

One other paradox: 81 percent of the party workers feels that their committees are held in good repute and at the same time 78 percent of them have stated that they do not expect success from their actions and lose out in nonstandard situations such as in demonstrations, strikes and so forth. In other words, the leadership problem at present is a problem of the competence of the leaders and their ability and capacity to conform to the new social realities.

Thus, the sphere of politics is rather complex and crucial and here the trends are the most contradictory. A majority of them is developing covertly, "throwing up" a slag of rapidly arising and just as quickly extinguishing emotions. No matter how heated they may be in taking

responsible decisions, there must not be hurried conclusions the consequences of which under extreme situations can be simply catastrophic. Instead of this example, take any of those which disturbed or continue to disturb the public recently. One can agree that while common sense is an important tool in decision-taking, it is essential to be guided by a precise, maximally balanced knowledge of the problem with a forecasting of all possible variations of its further development. Here science, including political sociology, is indispensable. For precisely this reason, aside from all else, it is essential to establish a mechanism making it possible to utilize science.

Scientists must still prove that political sociology is capable of not only providing precise knowledge of all the processes—general and particular—occurring in the system of power relationships, but also answer the questions raised by life and come up with an equally accurate and scientifically balanced recommendation and forecast for the future.

Then one can count not only on the consideration but also the incorporation of this information in the decision-taking process. This is the ideal. For now, unfortunately, one can speak merely of the start to such work. At present, politics is poorly armed with information, it knows little of the trends of political development and, consequently, it cannot forecast anything. It will pay full measure for underestimating science as a whole and in particular for the fact that for many decades it was viewed as a handmaiden and not as a very important tool for working out and taking political decisions.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya", 1990.

**The Social Problem of Moral Preparation for Family Life: The Role of Ethnic Pedagogics (From Ukrainian Material)**

915D0003C Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSEDOVANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 90 (signed to  
press 6 Aug 90) pp 60-71

[Article by Miroslav Ignatyevich Stelmakhovich, dean of the pedagogical faculty and professor of the Chair of Pedagogics and Primary Education Methods at the Ivano-Frankovsk Pedagogical Institute imeni V.S. Stefanik. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] Each year around 3 million marriages are concluded in our nation. What is the quality and stability of them? This is a very important question. Certainly, the stability of a marriage determines the stability of the family, its health, the presence and upbringing of children as well as the moral state of society as a whole. Certainly the family, as a stable social community, operates as a powerful factor in the shaping of the individual, in the reproduction of labor resources, in the handing on of social experience and the historical memory of people as well as ethnocultural traditions. The successful solving of these, as well as many other,

very important vital problems to a significant degree depends upon the moral preparation of young men and women for family life.

With good reason, A.S. Makarenko called for the instilling from childhood of qualities helping adults to become happy spouses. V.A. Sukhomlinskiy felt that "a person must be trained for maternal and paternal duty almost from the cradle" and that "this is one of the most difficult and most delicate tasks of upbringing" [1, p 183].

What has caused the subject of this article? Primarily the complexity and heterogeneity of the processes occurring in the family life of our contemporaries. Yes, at present in it there are very many alarming symptoms and deviant forms of conduct. This is what strikes the eye but is there a positive alternative? If so, where are the positive standards? Without embellishing reality, let me reply: there are such standards regardless of everything. It is simply that any positive thing requires hard work by the mind and close attention and for this reason, at first glance, may be "invisible," "humble" or "not make itself felt," and buried deep in social life. Evil is always on the surface and it does not require any particular intellectual effort or social analysis to notice it.

A situation has come into being which is alarming and, in my view, even paradoxical. On the one hand, there is the fact of the ubiquitous increase in the number of divorces and at the same time all the adults questioned by us of both sexes, different ages, types of employment and professions as well as rural and urban residents of Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast preferred, with rare exception, a matrimonial union to being single or widowed. This has always been the case and there is such a preference today in the public awareness. This idea is strong and rather stable.

According to the data of the Children's Funds, as a whole for the nation, each year over 700,000 children remain without one of the parents because of divorce and 500,000 are born outside of marriage. In many families, squabbles prevail which give rise to adultery, cynicism and sexual irresponsibility. Around 60 percent of the children in such families are orphans without both parents. Over the last 5 years, over 100,000 persons have been deprived of parental rights. One out of every 6th chronic alcoholic from the almost 5 million-strong army is a woman. Over the last 5 years, there have been 1,792 murders of neonates by the mother. Some 80 percent of the children in children's homes are orphans with living parents. Just over the last 5 years, the number of young drug addicts and substance abusers has increased from 4,000 to 27,000 persons.

In the Ukraine, each year 180,000 families break up. There are 146,000 children in incomplete families. Registered with the police are over 17,000 parents who persistently refuse to raise their children. Over the last 2 years, there has been a sharp exacerbation of the problem of juvenile crime. This has increased by almost 28

percent. Many juvenile lawbreakers are not employed and are not in school. In the republic there are almost 70,000 orphan children left without parental supervision. Over 36,000 children are in custody and the remainder are in boarding schools, children's homes and young girl homes. These are the children of "bolters," alcoholics, drug addicts and various criminals. Some 350,000 children suffer from mental problems and 70,000 are disabled.

One of the serious causes of the crisis state in the family lies in the extremely unsatisfactory preparation of the youth for matrimonial and parental life and the ignoring of the traditional national family-life culture and ethnic pedagogics. Over the centuries, among the worker the unshakable authority of the family, maternity and childhood were formed and were always carefully protected like a warmly burning hearth. Ethnic pedagogics was predominantly represented in parental ethnic pedagogics as one of the leading areas of the social creativity of the workers.

The object of the given research was the traditional family-domestic culture of the Ukrainian people and its role in the moral preparation of the youth for family life, while the subject of the research was the process of the ethnization of the children and juveniles as future spouses and parents on the basis of the progressive traditions of ethnopedagogics. The traditional forms and methods of family ethnization of individuals have been selected as the subject of the research because precisely they and only they operate in the life of every person as that driving sociopedagogical factor which contributes to the passing on of common human values from generation to generation.

For almost 10 years, the secondary schools have been studying "Ethics and the Psychology of Family Life" as an academic discipline but there have not been the expected results. And they scarcely will be. The more than 20-year work on studying the ethnopedagogics of the Ukrainian people as well as the research carried out by Soviet scientists such as V.Kh. Artuyunyan, G.S. Vinogradov, G.N. Volkov, A.Sh. Gashimov, A.E. Izmaylov, R.M. Pashayeva, Ya.I. Khabikov and others on the ethnopedagogics of other peoples have profoundly persuaded me that the moral preparation of young people for family life is truly feasible only when its realization will occur in the context of the daily life of the family itself, by the direct example of the parents and on the basis of ethnopedagogics and its organic component part of folk familology. With good reason it is said that "a child learns what he sees in his home as the parents are the example for him." Complete success in this important undertaking comes only when its ideas are combined with the ideas of ethnopedagogics, when it realizes the principles of the historical approach and embodies ideas which are close to the people and adequate to their traditional moral notions of the family, children, married status, parental duties, parental relations and their common human views of family life generally.



For carrying out the posed tasks, the following research methods were employed: observation, talks and interviews and questionnaires. To a significant degree, use was also made of the methods of statistics and retrospection and the generalizing of independent characteristics. The essence of the latter comes down to the processing of information by the researcher concerning an individual and coming from various sources including from the parents, teachers, contemporaries and other individuals who are accessories to the fact.

In 1979-1988, the opinions of over 700 persons were recorded including workers, kolkhoz members, white collar personnel, persons of elderly, middle and young ages living in the various regions of the Ukraine (Ivano-Frankovsk, Lvov, Rovno, Odessa, Vinnitsa, Donetsk,

Transcarpathian and Chernovtsy Oblasts) on the traditional question of assessing the family and its role in the life of man. All the respondents including persons of both sexes, various ages, types of employment and professions, the inhabitants of rural and urban population points, with very rare exception (3.8 percent) preferred a matrimonial union to being single or widowed.

The prestige of marriage was also confirmed by the general statistical data for our nation. While in 1959, 86.5 million men and women were married, in 1970, the figure was 107.2 million and in 1979, 122.6 million [2, p 77]. But regardless of this, the number of divorces continues to remain rather high. One has merely to recall that out of the annual 2.9 million new marriages, 900,000 matrimonial unions are dissolved [3, p 44]. A full general picture for the Ukraine is provided by the following statistical data (Table 1).

Table 1: Marriages and Divorces

Years	Number of Registered Marriages		Number of Registered Divorces	
	Total	Per 1,000 of the Population	Total	Per 1,000 of the Population
1950	433,500	11.7	9,700	0.3
1955	424,100	10.7	21,100	0.5
1960	458,900	10.7	53,000	1.2
1965	407,500	9.0	77,800	1.7
1970	465,800	9.8	135,400	2.9
1975	533,700	10.9	166,700	3.4
1980	463,300	9.3	181,700	3.6
1981	510,500	10.2	185,800	3.7
1982	500,100	9.9	181,600	3.6
1983	537,400	10.6	190,100	3.8
1984	450,000	8.9	186,600	3.7
1985	489,900	9.6	183,400	3.6

As we see, in the 1980s the number of divorces in the Ukraine stabilized on a very high level of 3.6 per thousand. In other words, approximately one out of every three families currently breaks up in our republic.

Presently, the most diverse aspects of family life have become the object of study for many sciences which overlap, complement and to a certain degree repeat one another. On the pages of the academic monographs, in the periodical press, as well as on the radio and TV broadcasts, a multiplicity of all sorts of proposals have been voiced on the reason for the "divorce boom" and among which the most typical are considered to be the following: the flippant attitude toward the concluding of marriage, the difficulties of mutual adaptation between the spouses, the irresolution of domestic problems, the weakening of social control and traditional motives which limit premarital sexual life and the cheating of spouses, alcoholism, the backwardness of the social and cultural maturity of the youth in comparison with sexual, the incorrectly understood freedom of divorce and the

abuse of the right to divorce, the inequality of duties which the men and women bear in the family and society as well as various subjective circumstances such as slander, rumor, quarrels, unjustified jealousy, boredom, a monotonous life, the superficiality of premarital acquaintance and its vain nature, migration processes and so forth.

Just how frequent are the manifestations of the above-mentioned factors or here are there also certain additional data? In order to answer these and other similar questions, let us turn to an examination of the concrete data for the rayons, individual population points and specific families in Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast.

For example, in Dolinskiy Rayon in 1985-1987, upon a court ruling in the ZAGS [Civil Registry] Department, 142 couples dissolved their marriage, including for the following reasons: 21 for marital infidelity; 77 for abuse of alcohol; 39 for fighting and 5 for parental intervention. By mutual agreement, a marriage was dissolved in

the ZAGS office by 19 couples, including: 9 for reasons of infertility, 3 for reasons of alcoholism; 3 new families were established; 3 were dissolved because of marital infidelity; 1 because of the absence of normal domestic

conditions. Here are the data on the duration of marital life and the number of children in families who filed for divorce in 1985-1987 in Galicheskii Rayon (Table 2).

**Table 2: Duration of Married Life and Number of Children in Families Filing for Divorce in 1985-1987 in Galicheskii Rayon**

Year	Total Divorces	Length of Married Life for Number of Children							
		In 1st Year	To 3 Years	To 5 Years	To 10 Years	Over 10 Years	One Child	Two and More	No Children
1985	92	4	22	11	24	31	44	20	28
1986	96	8	26	12	27	23	33	26	37
1987	88	8	15	17	33	15	34		20
Total	276	20	63	40	84	69	111	80	85

As is seen from the table, the largest number of divorces occurred during the period of up to 10 and over 10 years of joint conjugal life (55.4 percent). One is also struck by the fact that the divorces occur even in the first year of life of the newlyweds, during the so-called "adjustment" of characters and that among persons having a single child or no children at all, there are significantly more broken marriages than there are among those who have two and more children.

Interesting data were encountered in the village of Mikulichin which is located in the suburban zone of the national resort of Yeremche. The total number of the population in Mikulichin as of December 1987 was 5,000 persons. In 1982-1987, 252 marriages were registered here. Over the same period, there were 27 filings for divorce and of this number 25 were granted. Thus, over the 6 years the total number of divorces averaged 9.9 percent and for the years had the corresponding following distribution: 10.4 percent in 1982, 11.5 percent in 1983, 9 percent in 1984, 11.2 percent in 1985, 20 percent in 1986 and 6.9 percent in 1987.

The divorce filings were submitted basically by married couples who had lived together for not more than 5 years (80) for the following reasons: alcoholism (50 percent), marital infidelity (25 percent), property disagreements (10 percent), the absence of children (10 percent), parental interference (10 percent), a desire for independence (9 percent) and sexual disharmony (6 percent). As we see, the social conditions of the locality still impose their imprint on the formation of the "mosaic" of the divorces, although the general reasons are repeated but now a little in a different tradition. It is also important that the reasons for the divorces in a majority of instances appear not in a "pure" form but rather a mixed one. For instance, alcoholism, as a rule, entails sexual dissoluteness, the inflicting of insult, irresponsibility, sexual violations, property disputes and so forth.

The various sources provide rather extensive information on numerous negative consequences of divorces but the severest and most tangible of these are two: the demographic imbalance and the disorganization of the

family upbringing of children. The demographic imbalance consists primarily in a decline in the birthrate, a sharp drop in the increase in the population, as has occurred in the Ukraine and is clearly shown by the statistical data given below (Table 3).

**Table 3: Birthrate, Mortality Rate and Natural Increase of Ukrainian Population (per 1,000 of the population) [4, p 10]**

Years	Number of Births	Number of Deaths	Natural Increase
1940	27.3	14.3	13.0
1950	22.8	8.5	14.3
1955	20.1	7.5	12.6
1960	20.5	6.9	13.6
1965	15.3	7.6	7.7
1970	15.2	8.8	6.4
1975	15.1	10.0	5.1
1980	14.8	11.4	3.4
1981	14.6	11.3	3.3
1982	14.8	11.3	3.5
1983	16.0	11.5	4.6
1984	15.6	12.0	3.6
1985	15.0	12.1	2.9

Let us point out that the problem of divorces and the birthrate when combined forms an unique vicious circle: on the one hand, the most frequent to break up are the marriages of childless couples or those having just one child; on the other hand, in many instances the mothers refrain from giving birth to children or limit themselves to one child merely because they are not certain that their marriage will last. The fact, of course, is depressing but at the same time, very instructive and it turns out that children need parents as much as the parents need children and the folk pedagogical truth that children "impede" the destruction of the family and reinforce it is valid for all times.

In a number of books and articles, among the reasons for divorce rather constantly the idea is put forward of the irresolution of housing and domestic problems. This is a disputed opinion. The lack of domestic amenities of course can cause quarrels among the spouses. But it can also bring them together and cause them to try to jointly overcome the difficulties of life. Love and the marital union can be strengthened.

In certain families, the young spouses in the heat of emotion and passion over any question may submit a filing for divorce, break up the marriage and later return to their joint marital life. Conversations with many once-divorced men and women who even settled down with new families lead to the following conclusions. It turns out that in assessing their own actions, up to 45 percent of the questioned spouses took a negative view of the dissolution of their first marriages having stated that these were mistakes of youth and now they would not have done this but would have tried to keep their first family. In analyzing such self-evaluations, we must not discard the fact, in my view, of the "fashionableness" of divorce.

Thus, if one considers the presence of unsuccessful families, the divorces and their consequences, it becomes clear that the main reason for all the disasters and misfortunes is the same ill-preparedness of the young married couples for life together and it is essential to teach the young people to be husband and wife, father and mother. "Ignorance in this sphere dooms one to tears and the grief of children," wrote V.A. Sukhomlinskiy [1, p 185]. This is why in founding a family in our times the leading role is played precisely by the moral pedagogical factor.

Here of undoubted value is a close study of the traditions which have existed over the centuries in the pedagogical experience of family life as preserved by the people.

An analysis of practice and the data of the scientific research have shown that according to the traditions of ethnic pedagogics, the socialization of a young child and his preparation as a future family man are linked to the actual activities of the family itself. Every day in the life of a family acquaints a child with an enormous diversity of forms and images of behavior including words, mimicry, gestures, actions and manners, labor activity, relationships, value orientations and so forth.

A child not only sees and heard but also profoundly feels and sensitively perceives primarily the concern and attitude toward him on the part of the father and mother, elder brothers and sisters, grandfather and grandmother, neighbors and persons generally and thirstily, like a sponge, soaks up all this experience. Moreover, from the very first days after his birth (and the more so the older he is) he is also immediately involved in the vortex of family life with all its difficulties, carrying out the functions inherent to and befitting his age, sex and social status. We would add that in the family the child not only assimilates the standards of conduct existing in society, the "what is proper," that is, how he must live, what he must know, how he should behave, but also the "essential" of what life

actually is, how people behave in reality, from the positions of family moral notions.

And here the spiritual-moral and educational importance of the family as a social institution is completely disclosed. Precisely the family determines how closely the child's view of the world matches the notions of the "proper" and the "essential," duties and rights, word and deed.

Thus, family life itself with all its organization and relationships, the fixed order of the day, and the burden of concern and work for the child are the first, basic and essentially irreplaceable school of preparing the children for the future role of husbands and wives, fathers and mothers. If we view this on a broader basis, this is the educating of the citizens of one's fatherland.

Preparation for family life is as important as preparation for work. Here both labor and family education are carried out spontaneously, under natural circumstances, in an unforced manner, smoothly, gradually, at first glance even unnoticed, and is perceived by those around as self-evident knowledge. However, here the results are very important and the abilities are profound and lasting, as they say, for all one's life.

It is precisely here, in my view, that we find the main secret of parental skill.

Talks with many parents lead to the conclusion that according to folk notions the founding of a good family is an art. In order to have a good family, it is essential, in the first place, to want this and, secondly, it is essential to be able to create it. As a result, the leading principle is that indoctrination of a person's need for a family. And the essence of ability consists in the desire to establish correct family relations and raise children.

According to the traditional folk views of "family ethics," the persons of both sexes should be equally prepared for carrying out the noble mission of paternity and maternity. The need for a family, as the research has shown, is shaped most intensely when a child grows up surrounded by family harmony ("peace and concord are a major treasure"), kindness and affection ("there is always a good end for good children"). The children raised in such an environment even cannot imagine a situation outside the family and having reached maturity cannot conceive of how it would be possible to live without establishing one's own family. Such a view is a completely natural proof for the normally occurring process of preparing a future family man.

The profound impressions gained in the family in childhood largely predetermine the family position of its offspring when he himself becomes an adult. In the aim of rechecking the clarifying such a conclusion, in December 1987, we proposed that the students in the third year of the pedagogical faculty of the Ivano-Frankovsk Pedagogical Institute imeni V. Stefanik share in writing their reflections on the same subject but with certain nuances: for unmarried young men and women



"what our family meant for me"; for the married students "my family." Such a choice of the respondent was not made accidentally as, in the first place, the age of 18-22 years is marked by heightened interest in marriage and the family as many young persons are already married (in our case up to 37 percent) or are waiting to solemnize this at the ZAGS (8 percent); certain married students have one child (19 percent) or are pregnant (6 percent). Hence, they are capable of providing an objective assessment of the families from which they came as well as those they are creating themselves; secondly, among those questioned a majority (78 percent) was made up of newcomers living in student dormitories (42 percent) or in private apartments, that is, independent persons. The main task in the poll was to learn what positive features from the traditional family ethnopedagogics the students were adopting for themselves, what they are or would pass on to their children as well as to their students and their parents as a future teacher.

As a result, it turned out that a predominant majority of the respondents provided a very high (up to 76 percent) or good (24 percent) assessment of the family from which they came, having noted that "all the very best" which existed in the world they had gained in the family and that "the parents had raised and educated" and "taught them only the good." "I cannot even imagine," wrote the student L.A. Martynyuk, "how one could live without one's parents. I had the very best, the most caring, the most obliging." Many voiced gratitude toward their parents for having inculcated in them such moral qualities as industriousness, sincerity, respect for others, politeness, honesty, tenacity, justice, endurance and the ability to overcome possible difficulties.

The influence of the mother on the child's emotional world was particularly felt. Many of our respondents pointed out that from their mothers they had gotten such character traits essential for a wife and mother as sincerity, cordiality, tenderness, affability and clemency.

Along with gratitude toward parents, the need for a family is also passed on through the expression of the moral qualities of involvement in a "home," where one "was born and grew up," the attraction of a blood tie with brothers and sisters, veneration for grandmothers and grandfathers and the response of kinship and ancestors.

Each wanted a family that was close knit and collective where "all vital problems were settled in common," "each person had his own permanent place at the family table and the right to be heard" and all members of the family "helped one another."

The leading concern for all the respondents questioned by us was a desire to found a family similar to the one of their parents. "The family in which I grew up," wrote the student L.M. Mikityn, "is the ideal for me and the prototype of my future family."

The idea of adopting the "image of the family of one's parents" in our instance was dominant. The young

fathers and mothers expressed their need for a family through a sincere affection for children.

In all the received replies one could clearly trace the leading influence of family ethnopedagogics on the preparation of the future family member. If we construct our argument retrospectively, we will see the focus of ethnic pedagogics on a maximum utilization of the potential possibilities of each age period in the development of the individual for resolving this important problem.

The growing attention to the family was also aided by folk tales and children's games such as "wedding," "mamma and pappa," "mother's little girl" and "dolls." A strong impact on the development of the attributes of future parents is found in teaching the children, particularly juveniles, to take care of younger brothers and sisters and do housework. According to folk traditions, not only girls but also boys are introduced to this occupation which in all regards is beneficial.

Until recently there was a dominant dividing of family labor into "male" and "female." In accord with this, labor preparation had a differentiated nature with the girls being accustomed to the domestic labor of the mother such as "household," in the kitchen or near the children while the boys were accustomed to the everyday jobs of the father ("around the house," "in the courtyard, in the field").

In our times due to the fact that Soviet women are employed in social production equally with the men, the heaping of all domestic labor solely on the shoulders of the women is unacceptable and amoral.

At present, as observations show, a new tradition has arisen whereby the spouses perform domestic work in the house together and teach their children to do this.

In order that their sons and daughters in the future can organize their own family budget, a majority of the parents endeavor to involve them in planning family expenditures and income, in discussing purchases and distributing pocket money. A young man or woman who has grown up under such conditions, before getting married, gives serious thought to whether he or she is ready to assume domestic concerns and troubles.

According to the tradition of family ethnopedagogics, it is not acceptable that any of the juniors in the family outstrip the elder and a person is condemned who prematurely establishes a family without having either a job or his own earnings for the material support of the family.

According to the popular opinion, to prepare for family life means to help a younger individual realize that people are created one for another. This is of fundamental significance, particularly for a juvenile, 10-12 years of age, when the boys begin to show an aware interest in the opposite sex.

If a high moral atmosphere prevails at home, then there is no need for any special "universal" sex education,

since, according to folk views, moral education in the family (including sexual) operates as a permanent basis for shaping a correct attitude between the sexes.

Sexual closeness out of reciprocal love and within the family, the matrimonial union of man and wife for the sake of common happiness, for the joy of having children and raising them strengthen the desire to have a family, they eliminate "sexual incompatibility," they fill conjugal life with a spirit of vital optimism and confirm the conviction that true joy and happiness of a man and the enjoyment of a sexual life can only be found in the family. The simple folk truths according to which a man must be respected, a woman loved and children spared become true only under one condition. If they are "presented" and passed on by the entire way of family life, by the example of persons near, that is, if they are "intimate"; and are not declared by "outsiders," even very intelligent pedagogues, scientists, writers, physicians, in the school, at the institute, in the press, or by the radio and television media, that is, from the viewpoint of the family itself and the child are "neutral." Not an outside sex educator but rather the father should pass on to his son and the mother to her daughter the knowledge of the particular features of the male and female organism, their harmony in family and precisely family life. Here, of course, no one would play down the role of professional consultations, the recent scientific achievements and medicine and acquired by the specialist position and which the parents should undoubtedly receive (and want to receive).

Premarital preparation in ethnic pedagogics comes down to the establishing of a strong, healthy family which does not know dispute and quarrels, let alone divorce. On the basis of studying public opinion, it can be concluded that amidst the people there continues to be sharp condemnation for the divorce of spouses with children. The blame for a broken marriage, as a rule, rests on both spouses. Precisely they should do everything to preserve the family even for "the sake of the children."

The situation of the children of divorced parents in many instances is considered even worse and more dangerous than the situation of orphans. Thus, the approach in pedagogics to divorces is a strict and categorical one that they should not exist. This would be better both for the children and for the parents. It is scarcely likely that anyone after a divorce could feel happiness in another marriage when he learns that somewhere his own children abandoned by him have been left to the vicissitudes of fate.

According to folk views, divorce exists as an exception when after all the measures taken to maintain the family it becomes ultimately clear that this can no longer be done. There can be only two reasons for this: the impossibility of having and raising children or the complete degradation of one or both spouses. For this reason, in the mass practices of educating the youth, according to the folk traditions, a careful approach is observed in choosing the marriage couple as the leading basis for

establishing a strong family; for this purpose measures are propagandized which provide good premarital acquaintance of the future brides and grooms, which being them closer together and help them better know one another.

According to folk views, the more the boys and girls, the young men and women are in contact with one another the better. In order to be more frequently together, in former times in the Ukraine they established their own children's and youth "gromadas" (associations) the grounds for which was courting which in time would develop into matrimony. There were no reasons for the parent to be concerned for the behavior of their children as the meetings of the juveniles and the youth were always held "in the presence of others," that is, they were constantly under social supervision.

In time, the introduction of universal compulsory education in the school, the founding of the Pioneer and Komsomol organizations, the extensive network of extracurricular and cultural-educational institutions, sports, and the ever-growing migration of the population and other circumstances of an objective and even subjective nature moved the traditional juvenile and youth "gromadas" of a "courting" nature into the background and led to their disappearance. All the same, a longing for them among the youth has remained as is clearly seen, in my view, from the desire of contemporary juveniles, young men and women to establish their own informal age associations by interest and this is particularly noticeable in our towns. These associations should become an object of close attention by the representatives of our pedagogical and medical science and both for the theoretical and practical workers.

In family ethnopedagogics, significant efforts are channeled into developing a chivalrous attitude toward young girls in the boys and the desire to become a man, that is, to protect one's chosen against all dangers and misfortunes, to help and defer, never to insult or belittle her dignity, to assume all hardships and keep the promises given her. Fidelity in love, according to the folk views, is judged on the same level as military valor. And the main source of conjugal affection and fidelity is the ability to love generally, an attitude of respect on the part of the young man toward his mother, grandmother and sister which later grows into respect for the girl and his spouse. The truthfulness of such a viewpoint has gained persuasive substantiation in the scientific literature. "If, in growing up," A.S. Makarenko has written, "a child does not learn to love his parents, brothers and sisters, his school, his motherland, and if the principles of harsh selfishness are instilled in his nature, then it will be very difficult to suppose that he will be capable of deeply loving the woman selected by him" [5, p 413].

In the folk interpretation, love is nothing more than a feeling of spiritual attraction and profound heartfelt gratitude for a person of the other sex. Among the people there is support for an extended but not drawn-out courtship of the young girl by the man, and mutual

acquaintanceship with their parents so that the future newlyweds can be certain of the truthfulness of their reciprocal love, to distinguish this from fleeting attraction and quick or forced marriages are condemned. Only after the young man sees in a girl the traits desired by him in a future wife and mother, friend and like-thinker and housewife is he engaged to the girl. In turn, the girl also has an opportunity to think about her groom, to weigh, as they say, all the "pros" and "contras," and when she embroiders a "shirt and towel for her dear one," investing the warmth of her hands and heart in them.

Thus, the research carried out has led to the following conclusions and generalizations:

1. The acute need for strengthening the family and for fundamentally raising its social potential demands a radical change in the approaches to solving the problems of familology, the moral preparation of the youth for family life and the elaboration of an overall concept for the development of the modern family. The research conducted on the basis of the ethnographic, demographic and statistical materials of the Ukraine has shown that the moral preparation of the youth for family life operates, on the one hand, as a part of the general process of the forming of the individual and, on the other, also includes special educational actions to arm the younger generations with the knowledge and ability in the area of managing a family.

2. Since ancient times, a decisive role in the forming of the future spouses and parents has been played by ethnic pedagogics which is a treasurehouse of views, knowledge, means, abilities and skills worked out over many generations of people through the ages amidst the workers to raise the children and these have gained their ethnic embodiment in the family ethnopedagogics of each specific people. The irreplaceable role and importance of ethnic pedagogics in the moral preparation of the youth for family life is caused by the fact that it, in the first place, assumes the custody of the child from the very first days after its birth; secondly, in its content it encompasses all aspects in the development of the future family member: general social, ethnic, psychological-pedagogical, moral-ethical, emotional-aesthetic, physiological-hygienic and domestic-economic; thirdly, in its arsenal it has a complete range of diverse pedagogical forms, methods and procedures for the preparation of the future spouses, mothers and fathers and these are capable of founding strong families with a good pedagogical climate for the family rearing of children.

In being an important part of general human culture, ethnic pedagogics has incorporated in itself the best traditions of the laboring people and serves as an inexhaustible source of possibilities for realizing the functions of family education. The family, its traditions and spiritual values largely determine to what road the children will be led by the path from their home.

3. The transition to socialist construction during the post-October period has promised favorable conditions for the use of the progressive ideas of ethnopedagogics in the development of the scientific theory and practice of the family raising of children and juveniles. However, the deformations of socialism and the flagrant violations of the Leninist principles in the development of nationality culture committed in the 1930s-1970s painfully afflicted popular culture and led to a situation where many progressive ideas in ethnopedagogics were replaced by dogmatic, overly formalized ideas of official authoritarian pedagogics and were forgotten. This could not help but have a negative effect both on the development of the scientific theory of family raising as well as on the practice of the moral preparation of young people for family life and the spiritual state of society as a whole. This led to the loss of the high purpose of the family, to the ignoring of folk traditions and to the absence of public condemnation and disdain for those who doomed their children to being orphans.

4. The time has come to return decisively to ethnopedagogics, to restore the traditional status of the family with its unshakable authority, marital fidelity, love for children and dedication to the sacred duty of raising them, respect for parents and the maternal calling of women, as well as raise the role of the father and mother in establishing and protecting the home, providing in their exemplary model of the moral preparation of the youth for family life and return care to mankind. Certainly all that is of the people and traditional which from generation to generation has securely and firmly preserved the warmth of the home, kinship, honor and dignity of the family, the memory of genealogy, the knowledge of familology, family-domestic culture, the mutual obligations of parents and children, maternity and childhood, the moral health of the family have been brought together by the Ukrainians in the romantic concept of "bereginya" [care] [6] deriving from the word "berech" [to protect or care for]. What must be sacredly protected and preserved yesterday, today, tomorrow and always ("the greatest treasure is when there is happiness in the family").

5. The preparation of the younger generation for family life in the traditions of folk pedagogics is the forming of a profoundly moral feeling for the need to have one's own family, and to work out the knowledge, abilities and skills for its correct organization and for ensuring the upbringing of the children. This is carried out in all age stages in the development of the individual and is inseparable from the general problems of indoctrination.

6. The use of the knowledge of ethnopedagogics, places a real barrier against immorality, national nihilism, historical unawareness and helps the children and juveniles, the young men and women realize their civil duty as the heirs of folk family values and traditions, national culture, it teaches them to preserve the honor of the family, the genealogy, and to continue the undertaking of their parents, the previous generations and the people as a whole. In the given context, there should be great praise



for the pedagogical movement which developed over the last 5 years in the Ukraine upon the initiative of the teachers and parents at the Gnidinskiy NSSh [incomplete secondary school] in Kiev Oblast to study ethnology, and to establish the small school academies of folk arts, trades and crafts and which has received wide support in all the republic schools. At the center of all this work stands the study and popularizing of the best achievements of traditional, folk, national family-domestic culture, the ensuring of the succession of generations, the restoring of the authority of the family and moral preparation for family life. Such an approach to solving the problem is the most promising.

There can be no doubt that the future lies with the traditional, working, strong, healthy family based upon the spiritual principles of the people's morality and the knowledge of folk familology.

The second half of the 20th Century has completely confirmed this. Such a social phenomenon as the family is irreplaceable. Even the very raising of the question of a "substitute" for the family or the artificial insemination of humans or "test tube" children is absurd. The "sexual revolution" proclaimed in the West (incidentally, such a trend is now being felt in our nation if one takes into account the avalanche of information on sexual questions and which presently is oversaturating our press) in practice has meant millions of ruined lives, primarily those of women and children, while "free love" has meant a decline in morals and demoralization.

It is worthy of note that, regardless of the unleashing of the "sexual revolution," pornography, prostitution and the increased number of divorces, a majority of people in the West (from two-thirds to three-quarters according to various estimates) continues to hold firmly to the traditional family under any adversity. This is yet another clear and weighty proof of the great vital force of the family and traditional ethnopedagogics in the modern stormy, complex and contradictory human world.

#### Bibliography

1. Sukhomlinskiy, V.A., "Roditskaya pedagogika" [Parental Pedagogics], Kiev, 1978.
2. "Naseleniye SSSR" [USSR Population], Moscow, 1980.
3. Solovyev, N.Ya., "Semya v sotsialisticheskoy obshchestve" [The Family in the Socialist Society], Moscow, 1981.
4. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo Ukrainy SSR v 1959 [sic.] godu" [The Ukrainian Economy in 1959], Statistical Annual, Kiev, 1986.

5. Makarenko, A.S., "Polovoye vospitaniye" [Sex Education], Works in 7 Volumes, Vol 4, Moscow, 1957.

6. Skurativskiy, V.T., "Bereginya" [Care], Kiev, 1987.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya", 1990.

#### The Large Urban Family

915D0003D Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 90 (signed to  
press 6 Aug 90) pp 72-79

[Article by Yevgeniya Feliksovna Achildiyeva, candidate of economic sciences and science associate at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. She is the co-author of the book "Muzhchina i zhenishchina v semye" [Man and Woman in the Family] (1982). This is the first time she appears in our journal]

[Text] The basic aim of the article is to fill in certain gaps in the data concerning the status of the large Soviet family and to bring out its role and place in the present-day urban society. The author has based herself on the materials of sociological research conducted by the Sector of Social Problems of the Family and Marriage of the Sociology Institute Under the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1987-1988.<sup>1</sup>

Large families as one of the traits determining our social existence are disappearing. They remain prevalent only for the way of life in the republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. In the other regions of the nation, the number of mothers with large families is extremely insignificant [1, pp 59-67]. For example, according to the data of the USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], the share of third and fourth childbirths from the number of children born in 1986 was 14 percent, while five and higher numbers were 2.8 percent. For the RSFSR urban population, these figures are less: 11.6 and 1.3, respectively.

The quantitative characteristics of the state of family size in the nation do not provide the slightest notion of the qualitative changes in the large family. In essence, large families are viewed by specialists in the area of family problems as a certain phenomenon which is now becoming a matter of the past as the way of life is transformed, as the urban industrial conglomerations grow and as the established foundations of everyday life are destroyed. In a concentrated form, this viewpoint was expressed in the article of S.I. Golod [2, pp 19-20]. Families which under the altered conditions prefer large size are viewed as a social deviation and their tendency to broaden is explained by the action of traditional stereotypes, by the inability to adapt to the new and by a number of other similar factors. Such a position has led to a view where the sociologists and social psychologists have lost interest in the large families, in the changes in their internal structure and the dynamics of motivation for the appearance of several children.

In the research on the results of which the current article has been based, no use has been made of the currently generally accepted demographic criterion for the level of family size: one or two children for a small family, three or four for a medium-sized family and five and more for a large family. For, we feel, in defining this concept it would be more accurate to use the sociopsychological criteria for conformity to the social standards of family size. Then the significance of the "threshold" beyond which a family is considered large would vary for the different regions of the USSR. Thus, in towns with a small average number of children in a family, for instance, in Moscow and Leningrad, a three-child family is large. For the Central Asian republics, three or five children in a family is the current standard and the application of different social standards to this part of the nation would lead to unjustified bias in the notions.

The resorting to a certain standard of family size depending upon what region is under discussion and the introduction of a gradation of family size "less than standards," "standard level," "above the standard" and "significantly above the standard" reflects the attitude toward the number of children in the family and certainly contributes to an adequate analysis of family size as a phenomenon. In a general form, a family (and a mother) having more children than is prescribed by the social norm is considered to be a large one. With such an approach in regions where families with one-two children predominate, a large family would be one in which there are three and more, and family size significantly above the standard (a super-large family) would be calculated from the sixth child.

#### Sociodemographic Characteristics and Conditions in the Life of a Large Family

In the studied aggregate there were 68 percent of the families with three children, 14 percent with four, 12 percent with five and 6 percent with six and more. One-fifth of it (21 percent) was made up of extended families, three generation and here prevailing are those where the wife's parents live (15 percent); there are noticeably fewer parents of the husband (6 percent). The family status of the large-family spouses is characterized by the data of Table 1.

**Table 1: Family Status of Parents With Three and More Children by Moment of Poll**

Versions of Replies	Family Status			
	Mothers		Fathers	
	Absolute	%	Absolute	%
First marriage	340	80	354	83
Second marriage	64	15	47	11
Widow (widower)	3	1	—	—
Divorced	11	3	7	2
Never in registered marriage	5	1	—	—
Not indicated	2	0	17	4

For comparison, we would point out that in Moscow the schoolchildren with families from one or two children live in a complete family in 68 percent of the instances and here in 4 percent there is a stepparent [3, p 108]. If one judges the level of satisfaction with marriage, among large-family mothers this is also higher than among women having one or two children. Some 53 percent of those questioned were completely satisfied and 6 percent were not satisfied. For small-family female Muscovites, these indicators are 36 and 31 percent, respectively [4, p 42].

A study of the living conditions of children from large families has shown that families with three or four children for this parameter differ substantially from those with five and more children. This is seen from the data of the intragroup average values. As a whole for all the questioned families, the average monthly income per member was 59.1 rubles, in families with three children it equaled 73.8 rubles, and with six and more children, 43.8 rubles. At the same time, it is apparent that for a predominant majority of the families, the per capita income does not exceed 70 rubles, that is, it is below the minimum standard even considering the received aid.

Now let us turn to Table 2 which contains information on the educational level of the spouses at the moment of the poll. Here one can clearly note differences between the parents (both men and women) in the individual family-size groups.

**Table 2: Educational Level of Spouses at Moment of Poll, %**

Education	Mother			Father		
	2 Children*	3-4 Children	5 and More Children	2 Children*	3-4 Children	5 and More Children
Primary	1	—	—	2	—	—
Secondary	15	10	22	19	8	20
General secondary	28	33	38	24	20	31
Specialized secondary	28	26	16	19	19	13
Higher and incomplete higher	27	31	23	33	51	31

**Table 2: Educational Level of Spouses at Moment of Poll, % (Continued)**

Education	Mother			Father		
	2 Children*	3-4 Children	5 and More Children	2 Children*	3-4 Children	5 and More Children
Academic degree	0.3	—	1	2.3	2	5
No reply	0.5	—	—	0.5	—	—

\* The data on the educational level of parents with 2 children are given from [5, p 42]. In the columns where the total is less than 100 percent, the fractions have been rounded off.

A comparison of the educational level of parents with two children and large families leads to somewhat unexpected conclusions. For mothers with three or four children it is higher than among women with two children but, in truth, it is still somewhat lower for those with five and more. Around one-quarter of the respondents from this group had received a higher education. The educational level of the fathers of three or four children significantly exceed that achieved by the levels of two, while for men with five and more children, it is almost the same as with two.

Seemingly, in terms of educational level, the mothers of two children are positioned somewhere between the mothers of the other investigated groups. If in this circumstance we see an expression of a certain averaged indicator for the educational level of women having children, then its range is much broader for large-family mothers. For this reason, probably, it would be wrong to assert that a large-sized family is often the consequence of the low educational level and the overall cultural development of the women.

In studying family size in the urbanized regions of the nation, it is important not to overlook the regulation of the birthrate and the intervals between the appearance of children. Regulating the number and time of the appearance of children for mothers with large families, like those with few children, is extremely ineffective. According to the data of a medical social survey of families with four and more children, for won large-family mother there was an average of six-eight pregnancies, of which 4.9 ended in birth, 1.6 in abortions and 0.3 in miscarriages [6, pp 192-193]. The impression is gained that a large family endeavors to control the birth of the children. The average number of pregnancies for a large-family mother is no higher than the analogous indicator for women with one or two children, although their outcomes varied: for the former these were predominantly births and for the latter abortion. At the same time, there are groups of large-family mothers who completely reject the control over the number of births. These include women (and often the families as well) among whom a traditional religious view of maternity prevails.

In the 425 studied families, 1,491 children were born. The average number of children in a family was 3.51. Of this number, 10 percent was of an age under 3 years, 25 percent of an age from 3 to 7 years, 48 percent from 7 to 15 years, 8 percent from 15 to 17 years and 9 percent

over 17 years. The press has repeatedly voiced the opinion that in a large family sick children are born more frequently, the parents often leave the children in a child's home, turn them over to a boarding school and so forth. According to our data, the number of families where such deviations were observed is small. Just 3.5 percent of all the juveniles did not live with their parents, and of this number just 8 were in children's homes or special medical institutions for sick children. Possibly these figures are understated, as the situation was recorded from the replies of the mothers without the corresponding control.

It is disconcerting that only 21 persons out of the total number of children, according to the poll, were studying in a VUZ. It is perfectly clear that the difficult material situation of a family with several children impedes the obtaining of a higher education.

As a whole, the given characteristics demonstrate both definite variations among the large families as well as substantial differences between the families with one or two children and the large ones, but these differences should not be assessed by the scales of "good—bad" or "promising—dying." At present, the particular features which distinguish large families from small ones are understood but the answers to the questions of what are the social, demographic and psychological consequences and what is the forecast for the development of a family with several children as yet are not given.

#### **Professional Employment of a Large-Family Mother**

With a low family income, large-family mothers are forced to engage in professional activities for the sake of earnings. This combined with the raising of the children greatly complicates the situation. Almost never is a women able to carry out both these tasks simultaneously without detriment to the child, her job or her own health. Nevertheless, around 70 percent of the female respondents was employed in production permanently, while another 15 percent was not working temporarily. As is known, the enterprises are reticent to hire women with large families and for a majority of them the birth of the fourth child means a drop in professional status and a transfer to less skilled employment.

It is rather difficult to find employment under preferential conditions with convenient working hours for the family. Some 59 percent of those questioned was employed at enterprises with a fixed working day and



remained there during this entire time, around 14 percent could use the advantages of a rotating schedule, 13 percent had free hours, 9 percent an incomplete day and 3.5 percent worked at home. The nonworking respondents, and they were 21 percent, did not intend to work in the future in a quarter of the cases, 37 percent did not intend to return to their former job in the next year and 30 percent were ready to return to production life under suitable conditions. A majority of the unemployed mothers pointed out that they would prefer a complete or incomplete workday with free working hours. Very few desired to work at home. An analysis of telephone formalized interviews with inspectors of the bureaus for job placement and information of the public in Moscow makes it possible to understand why so many large-family mothers are disinclined to work at home as this, as sometimes seems, would provide an opportunity for them to combine their family and production roles [7, pp 9-13].

We should point out that none of the inspectors was interested in the profession, education or last place of employment of the large-family mother who turned to him with a request for a job. They all had a meager range of types of activity which clearly did not require a high level of education or special knowledge. Thus, in the 24 bureaus, they proposed the sewing of children's articles, aprons, skirts, pillowcases, shorts, mittens, blouses, collars, cloaks and overcoats; in 4 the knitting of hats and jackets; in 3 the assembling of electrical appliances.

Among other operations was the manufacture and applying of labels, the weaving of nets and embroidery. All of this came down to a situation where a large-family mother with a higher or specialized secondary education, with sufficient skills, in being forced by material circumstances to engage in professional activity, would work not in her specialty and would not fully utilize her training.

This is the general situation with job placement for women with large families. But let us look at the problem also from the other side. Should a large-family mother work? Why is her labor in raising the children and looking after them still not recognized as socially useful and not properly paid?

Clearly, the unenviable plight of a mother with a large family is an extreme case of the unstructuring of relations between the family as the cell of society and the state as the legal and financial regulator of relations in society. The question concerning the principle of the material involvement of the state in the reproduction of new generations should be raised and resolved during the introduction of the decree which sets pensions for elderly persons regardless of how many children they raised. In other words, the birth and raising of children in essence have ceased to guarantee support in old age. This is why, in eliminating the dependence between the reproduction function and the material source of existence, it is important to realize that in the future there will be a greater demand for a major material contribution by

society to the reproduction of the population. Unfortunately, this has not yet happened.

Thus, in viewing professional employment from the viewpoint of interest to us, it is essential to distinguish the following aspects: 1) the objective necessity of a second wage in a large family. This means that with the existing situation a woman would be forced to work at least an incomplete workday; 2) the desire of the mother to combine professional labor and the raising of children and this forces her rather frequently to work "out of sync," that is, to lose her specialty and skill, to lose in wages, turning to unskilled work at home or any other job close to the home; 3) the desire of woman to obtain the possibility of a truly viable choice between participation in the production sphere (having entrusted the raising of her children to state institutions) and restricting her activities to housework and the family circle. The current palliative solutions do not contribute to the free choice of a lifestyle by a mother with a large family and for this reason it is not correct to speak about her attitude toward professional employment as a value characteristic.

#### The Roots of Large Families

The concept of a "large family," like any other generalizing concept, needs clarification and the establishing of different properties for typologization. As the basic typologizing feature we have taken the notion of those getting married about the value of several children.

According to such an approach, the first type of family is characterized by a family size which is a consequence of the attitude realized by the spouses toward children as the main wealth. This (let us call it the "new" large family), in being dictated by the own particular ideas of the spouses and which do not correspond to the opinion of the social circle, contradicts the family size standards existing in the region and, as a rule, is accompanied by a high level of social activeness by the husband and wife. It is hard to predict the development prospects for such a family although it is the most interesting for the researcher.

In the second type is the large family arising as a result of the appearance of a larger number of children in the family than the spouses assumed at the start of their life together and it is a question not of changes in ideas but rather corrections caused by external factors. Such a phenomenon is encountered not so rarely and is related to the birth of twins or triplets and at times with the late awareness of the onset of an undesired pregnancy. Here also are the instances of the birth of the next child due to the fact that for medical indications it was not desirable to interrupt the occurring pregnancy. A particular situation is the merging of incomplete families with several children. Here one can clearly trace a tendency to reinforce the newly established family by a common child. For many adaptation to the "forced" large family (these, as a rule, are families with three or five children) is a difficult and protracted process. However, the family

stabilizes and produces good citizens which are viable from the viewpoint of society. Such a type may conditionally be termed a family with actualized views of family size.

In the third type of family, the large number of offspring is a manifestation of a certain trouble when for the spouses or for one of them the children become an instrumental value as due to them there is the hope of gaining certain goods or advantages. But most frequently it must be stipulated that the incentive reasons are the sociopsychological aspirations for self-realization, for asserting high self-approval which differs from the opinion of those around, for justifying the way of life condemned by society and so forth.

In this category, we would include the families where large size is the result of several divorces and remarriages. Such families are poorly organized and frequently the upbringing of the children is put off onto social institutions such as creches, the 24-hour nursery and the boarding school. From this, the multiplicity of deviations in their conduct and the development among a portion of the public of a view of large families as a negative phenomenon.

There is a number of explanations for the existence of large families under the unsuitable conditions for this of the large cities. One of these is based upon the thesis of so-called residual large families in accord with which this is viewed as a phenomenon based upon obsolete social standards for the birth of children. The reasons for this are seen in ideas which have not lost their force among certain natives from regions where a high birthrate has survived.

Another explanation assumes that a large family reproduces itself, that is, in instilling the corresponding notions in the children it establishes the grounds for the appearance of large families in regions where the birth of several children is the exception and not the rule.

There are also explanations which contain religious and moral motives. Certainly for believers the destruction of

an already created life and even the attempt to prevent conception is a sin. Moreover, there are families which cultivate a neglectful attitude toward conception and the inadmissibility of abortions out of morality considerations not related to religion.

It turns out that if large families are reproduced out of a residual principle or are reproduced spontaneously from a narrow circle of families marked by this, then the parents who have several children should have been raised in large families. Our research does not confirm this hypothesis (61 percent of the mothers and 54 percent of the fathers were raised in families with one or two children) and shows the applicability of the mentioned explanations for the roots of large families only to individual families. These explanations cannot be applied even to a larger portion of the precedents. In any event, having assumed that a large family based on residual social standards would disappear after one or two generations, it is valid to assume that the "new" large family will survive. And the creation of favorable living conditions for it will be as before an urgent task which will not disappear automatically.

An analysis of the motives for large-family maternity (realized by women to a varying degree) entails many obvious and latent difficulties. In questioning the respondents according to a formalized questionnaire with a maximum number of "concealed" and "semiconcealed" questions, they were offered nine variations for disclosing the reasons for their large families. Arbitrarily these can be divided into three groups (Table 3): 1) the idea prior to the start of the reproductive period in the family (at the moment of concluding the marriage) on the part of both or one of the parents for the birth of several children, that is, the awareness of their individual value and its realization over life; 2) situational reasons causing large families; 3) interpretations which did not contain reasons for large families. This did not reflect the attitude toward a large family as a primary value. This was explained not by a decision but by the fact that "this is how it happened."

Table 3: View by Women of Their Own Family Size, %

Statement of Reason	Number of Replies	%	Groups of Reasons
Upon getting married, husband and I decided we would have many children	40	9.4	
I always wanted to have many children in the family and my husband was not against this	31	7.3	I
My husband always felt that the family should have a lot of children and was able to insist on this	34	8.0	
	total	24.7	
In getting married we did not want to have a large family, but when the first child was born we changed our attitude toward children	22	5.2	
We wanted to have a child of the opposite sex	62	14.6	II
We did not intend to have more than 2 children, but the birth of twins altered everything	17	4.0	

Table 3: View by Women of Their Own Family Size, % (Continued)

Statement of Reason	Number of Replies	%	Groups of Reasons
	total	23.8	
We intended to have children and the family size took care of itself	102	24.0	III
Upon getting married I had no idea how many children we would have	83	19.5	
	total	43.5	
Other reply	4	0.9	
Did not reply	30	7.1	

While the first group of motives was mentioned by around one-quarter of those questioned and the second by approximately the same number, almost half was in the third group where there was no planning of the number of children in the present understanding of this term. These data point to essential differences in the notions of the respondents concerning their own large families.

Certain results of the conducted poll have been given. They do not exhaust the materials of our research. Of the problems remaining beyond this article of the greatest interest are the following: the psychology of large families; the structure of relationships in the family; the social activeness of the parents. An examination of these will be the theme of future publications.

#### Footnote

1. The sampling included mothers with three and more children (although two children were not over the age of 16). The poll was carried out in Sevastopolskiy and Kuybyshevskiy Rayons of Moscow. A total of 425 questionnaires were processed.

#### Bibliography

1. Vishnevskiy, A.G., Shcherbov, S.Ya., Anichkin, A.B., et al., "Recent Trends in the Birthrate in the USSR," *SOTSIOLOG. ISSLED.*, No 3, 1988.
2. Golod, S.I., "Large Families in the Mirror of Statistics," *OGONEK*, No 26, 1988.
3. Aristova, N.G., "Socialization of the Younger Generation and the Family," "Semya i sotsialnaya struktura" [The Family and Social Structure], Moscow, IS AN SSSR, 1978.
4. Gurko, T.A., "Satisfaction With Marriage as an Indicator of Conjugal Relations," "Semya i sotsialnaya struktura," Moscow, IS AN SSSR, 1987.
5. Antonov, A.I., Medkov, V.M., "Vtoroy rebenok" [The Second Child], Moscow, Mysl, 1987.

6. Cherepanova, I.S., "The Large Family as an Object of Comprehensive Medical and Hygienic Research," "Planirovaniye semi i natsionalnyye traditsii" [Family Planning and National Traditions], Tbilisi—Moscow, IS AN SSSR, 1988.

7. Achildiyeva, Ye.F., Zhiritskaya, I.G., "Solving the Problem of Professional Employment of Large-Family Mothers: Proposals and Requirements," "Prognozirovaniye sotsialnogo razvitiya i demograficheskikh protsessov v usloviyakh NTP: Vsesoyuz. nauch. knof. (Dilizhan, 24-26 maya 1988)" [Forecasting the Social Development and Demographic Processes Under the Conditions of Scientific-Technical Progress: All-Union Scientific Conference (Dilizhan, 24-26 May 1988)], "Section III. Socioeconomic Research on Marriage, the Family, Reproductive Notions and the Questions of Population Forecasting," Yerevan, 1988, pp 9-13.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Sotsiologicheskoye issledovaniye", 1990.

#### Drugs Among the Student Youth

915D0003E Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 90 (signed to  
press 6 Aug 90) pp 84-91

[Article by Anzor Aleksandrovich Gabiani, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor and chief of the Caucasus Department of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the USSR MVD, deputy leader of the Center for the Study of Public Opinion Under the Georgian CP Central Committee. He is the author of the books "Ot vrednoy privychki k tyazhelomu zabolovaniyu" [From a Harmful Habit to a Severe Illness] (1986, co-author), "Narkotiki vchera i segodnya" [Drugs Yesterday and Today] (1988) and "Na krayu propasti: narkomaniya i narkomany" [On the Edge of the Abyss: Drug Addiction and Drug Addicts] (1990)]

[Text] Although the atmosphere which reigned in our nation of complacency and silence over drug addiction has given way to openness and concern, the real scale of the phenomena as before is poorly understood. It is still felt that the main problems are related to drunkenness and alcoholism while drug addiction and particularly substance abuse are not part of the traditions of our



people. Such views have impeded an adequate assessment of the approaching danger.

It is generally known what a serious attitude is taken by the entire world to combating the spread of drugs. In our nation where prior to the 1960s drug addiction was not particularly widespread, just the first steps are being taken to overcome this very grievous affliction. Among these was the first nationwide research conducted in mid-1989 according to a program and under the leadership of the article's author. In accord with the program, around 2,000 drug users and drug addicts were questioned, along with 2,000 experts (these were workers from the law enforcement and medical institutions) and a little less than 6,000 students in the general education schools and PTU [vocational-technical school]. It is not difficult to explain the choice of the juveniles and youth as respondents as in our nation one virtually does not encounter persons of this age among the registered abusers of drugs and drug addicts and there are around 130,000 of these in our nation. At the same time, the specialists are aware that a gravitating toward drugs occurs precisely in the juvenile period. Finally, the attitude of the juveniles and the youth to drug use not only provides a notion of the spread of the terrible malaise but also makes it possible to look at our tomorrow. Those who are currently 14-17 years of age are the future of our nation and the people who will be living in the 21st Century.

Within the research we studied the question of the attitude of the students in the general education schools and the PTU to drugs, toxic substances and alcoholic beverages. Using a specially compiled program in eight regions of the USSR, with the questionnaire method we polled 5,861 students in the senior grades of the general education schools and PTU. These included 858 persons in Latvia (14.6 percent), 815 in Stavropol Kray (13.9 percent), 872 in Gorkiy Oblast (14.9 percent), 736 in Novosibirsk (12.6 percent), 961 in Moscow (16.4 percent), 823 in Tashkent (14 percent) and 59 persons in Primorskiy Kray (1 percent). (Such a small number of persons questioned in Primorskiy Kray was explained by the fact that the officials prohibited the carrying out of the research in their region.)

Of the persons questioned, young men comprised 51.1 percent, young girls 48.3 percent, with no information on 0.6 percent. By age, the respondents were distributed in the following manner: 1 percent under the age of 14, 9.9 percent were 14, 27.9 percent were 15, 33.4 percent were 16, 21 percent were 17, 4.3 percent were 18 and older with 2.2 percent providing no information. Thus, a majority of our respondents by the moment of the poll had already reached the age of 16. By nationality they were: 68.2 percent Russian, 11.2 percent Ukrainian, 8.4 percent Latvian, 4.6 percent Uzbek and 0.9 percent Belorussian. This is completely natural if one considers in what regions the research was carried out. Of all the persons questioned, pupils in the general education schools comprised 2,896 (49.4 percent), in the PTU there were 2,889 (49.3 percent), with no information on

the respondents for 76 (1.3 percent). In the former were pupils in the senior grades, from 8th through 10th (11th).

Since there is the opinion that the reason for the turning to drugs is frequently a desire to gain an altered mental equilibrium, we checked just how comfortably the young people feel among their contemporaries and whether they have any particular difficulties with studies, discipline and so forth. The obtained results repudiate the widespread stereotypes. Thus, 44.4 percent of the respondents study with good and excellent grades, 52.6 percent show average and 2.4 percent show poor. Many of them show social activeness. In any event, some 60.6 percent provided an affirmative answer to the question "Do you take part in the social life of the school or PTU?"

A significant portion of those questioned not only studied excellently, but in the school collective of contemporaries felt psychologically completely comfortable. Thus, to the question "How do your comrades in the classroom or group relate to you?" our respondents replied in the following manner: 8.9 percent very well, 55.6 percent well, 22.4 percent satisfactorily, 1.1 percent poorly, 0.3 percent very poorly and 1.7 percent with no information. Thus, a predominant majority of 96.9 percent felt that their comrades in the classroom and group related very well, well or satisfactorily to them and hence in the collective of contemporaries they feel completely at ease, in no manner have they been infringed upon in their "prestigious" interests and are not in the category of young men and women experiencing difficulties of a sociopsychological order.

As might be expected, our respondents responded completely adequately to the good relations to themselves and replied with reciprocity. Some 15 percent related very well to their comrades, 61.9 percent answered well, 20.7 percent answered satisfactorily, 1.1 percent replied poorly, 0.4 percent replied very poorly and 0.9 percent provided no information. Consequently, an insignificant portion of those questioned, some 1.5 percent, experienced dislike or hostility toward comrades and this also shows a good psychological climate in the collective. An analysis of the replies to the questions relating to the attitude toward studies and discipline makes it possible to feel that on this level not everything was quite right in the collectives, but our respondents did not differ from other students in the secondary schools and PTU and for this reason their opinions and judgments are characterized by a rather high degree of reliability.

Very interesting were the replies by the juveniles to the question of what their comrades at school ordinarily engage in during their free time. The replies were distributed in the following manner: 8.9 percent study in a scientific or technical circle, 11.3 percent participate in amateur activities, 19.1 percent attend theaters and concerts, 9.6 percent visit museums and exhibits, 59.2 percent go to a discotheque, 65.6 percent the theater, 52.6 percent meet with friends, 22.1 percent indulge in alcoholic beverages, 2 percent take drugs, 1.3 percent take toxic substances

and 9.5 percent did not answer the given question.<sup>1</sup> It must be pointed out that the share of those questioned who as usual activities in free time mentioned the taking of drugs, varied widely by the regions from 11.7 percent in Primorskiy Kray and 4.7 percent in Tashkent to 0.5 percent in Lvov Oblast and 0.7 percent in Gorkiy Oblast. As a whole, the proportional amount of respondents who indicated that the taking of alcoholic beverages and drugs is an ordinary occupation for their school friends is rather high (let us recall that the poll was taken not in the special schools or special PTU and particularly not in the labor education colonies for juvenile criminals but in ordinary institutions of learning).

Since particular significance is given to the answer to this question (normal young men and women according to all currently existing standards should not consume alcoholic beverages at all, let alone use drugs and toxic substances), for clarification the respondents were asked the question: What portion of their comrades or friends at school or the PTU use alcoholic beverages. Some 2.3 percent felt all students did, 13.5 percent assumed not all but a majority, 9.6 percent divided the drinkers and nondrinkers by equal halves, 22.5 percent were convinced that a minority of their comrades drank while over a third of those questioned found it difficult to answer this question. Thus, 25.4 percent of those questioned felt that among their comrades at school or the PTU,  $\frac{1}{2}$  or more of the young men and women consume alcoholic beverages. Only 15 percent felt that none of them did this.

If we take the number of those who pointed out that "their comrades at school and the PTU consume alcohol" as 100 percent, then it turns out that 2.8 percent feel that they do this every day, 6.5 percent twice a week, 10.2 percent once a week, 10.6 percent twice a month, 9.2 percent once a month, 14 percent more rarely than once a month, while 46.7 percent found it difficult to reply (this is quite natural since not all the students consume alcoholic beverages together with their school comrades).

To the question "Do you yourself drink alcoholic beverages?" over  $\frac{1}{2}$  of those questioned (52.8 percent) provided an affirmative answer. This is a fact which causes great alarm and forces one to reflect. In truth, a majority (64.4 percent) imbibes infrequently, less than once a month. At the same time, 12.8 percent consumes alcoholic beverages rather regularly, once or more times a week, and 24.3 percent at least twice a month. It is important to know that the data on the frequency of consuming alcoholic beverages are very similar for all the regions where the research was conducted, and this significantly raises the degree of reliability of the information. Among the drinking students, a definite attitude has already formed toward various alcoholic beverages. Among them 52.5 percent prefers champagne, 42 percent beer, 28.8 percent vodka, 22.1 percent liquors, 20.1 percent cognac, 13.2 percent fortified wines, 10.6 percent home brew, while for 17.2 percent it made no difference what they drank. Thus, a significant portion

of those questioned willingly drinks strong alcoholic beverages including home brew and which are particularly harmful for the health of the still unformed organism, and are rather well informed about them.

The next range of questions in our research concerned the attitude of the students to drugs. To the question "Have you heard that a certain portion of the students in the secondary schools or PTU takes drugs?" some 34.6 percent answered affirmatively. In certain regions, this indicator was even higher: 50.8 percent in the Primorskiy Kray, 44.5 percent in Stavropol Kray and 42.9 percent in Tashkent. Of those answering affirmatively, 38.4 percent felt that drug consumption among the students is widespread or even very widespread. Some 19.6 percent pointed out that they knew reliably of instances of the taking of drugs by their comrades, friends and acquaintances, while 13.4 percent admitted that they themselves had indulged.

After this, the respondents were asked the question "Have you personally tried drugs?" The reply, if we exclude mass self-implication, was completely disastrous: of the 5,800 persons questioned, 597 (10.2 percent) indicated that they had tried drugs. Now let us endeavor to reason calmly. For a start, let us remember that we questioned students in 8th-10th (11th) grades of the general education schools and students in the 1st-3d year of instruction in the PTU. In statistics the pupils are usually grouped from the 4th-8th and 9th-10th (11th) grades. In the first group are 22.1 million juveniles. In order to determine the approximate number of 8th graders, let us divide this number by 5 and to the obtained result add the 6.5 million students in the 9th-10th (11th) grades and the 4.27 million students in the PTU [1].

Consequently, as a total in the 8th-10th (11th) grades of the general education schools and the PTU, there are 15.19 million students. If we assume that in all the institutions of learning there is approximately the same situation, then it turns out that studying in them are 1.5 million juveniles who have tried drugs at least once.

We of course are aware of the inaccuracy of such an extrapolation and for this reason for increasing the reliability we have divided this figure by  $\frac{1}{2}$ . It turns out that among this contingent of young men and women there are around 750,000 drug users. Even if it is assumed that the figure is inflated by 100,000, all the same the results differ sharply from the official data as there are around 130,000 drug addicts and users registered in our nation. In truth, it is very crucial that the indicator for the use of drugs by juveniles differs sharply by regions. If one disregards the Primorskiy Kray were 45.8 percent of those questioned pointed out that they had already tried drugs, even for the other regions the figures are rather alarming: in Stavropol Kray such a reply was given by 17.2 percent, in Tashkent 14.6 percent, in Novosibirsk Oblast 8.6 percent, in Gorkiy Oblast 7.8 percent, in Latvia 7.6 percent, in Moscow 6.9 percent and in Lvov Oblast 6.5 percent. Thus, the

indicator for the drug usage varies from 17.2 percent to 6.5 percent, but even this "lower" level is above the one on which we based our calculation, as we proceeded from the assumption that 5 percent of the senior grade students had tried narcotics. And if furthermore we recall the opinion of specialists who feel that out of eight or nine persons who have tried drugs only one subsequently goes on to use them systematically, a very lamentable conclusion can be drawn: merely among those currently studying in senior grades and the PTU, according to the meagerest, reduced estimates, at least 75,000 in the next few years will join the ranks of drug addicts.

The correctness of the conclusion is indirectly confirmed by the fact that far from all of those questioned and who admitted drug use had taken them just once. Unfortunately, in real life this is rarely the case. In particular, of the young persons questioned by us, some 2.7 percent took drugs systematically, 1.8 percent very frequently, 3.2 percent frequently, 6.7 percent not very frequently, 13.1 percent rarely, 61.3 percent very rarely and 11.2 percent did not reply. It turns out that approximately one out of four of those questioned (27.5 percent) used drugs not so rarely, while 14.4 percent did this rather rarely and there is a great probability that in the near future they will become drug addicts (let us remember that often it is enough to take drugs just several times for the young person to develop systematic use and from here it is just one step to addiction).

In the conducted research there are also data on what drugs were taken by the questioned students. It turned out that hashish was taken by 33.5 percent, morphine by 23.1 percent, opium by 2.8 percent, promedol by 3.7, codeine tablets by 5.4 and koknar [an opium derivative] by 3 percent. Some of those questioned took two or more different drugs and for this reason the total of the drugs mentioned by them significantly exceeds 100 percent (134.2 percent). Due to the fact that for our respondents the most frequently consumed were hashish and morphine, we traced their "popularity" by the regions. Hashish was mentioned among the drugs consumed in Tashkent by 57.5 percent of those questioned, 44.3 percent in Stavropol Kray, 32.4 percent in Gorkiy Oblast, 17.5 percent in Novosibirsk Oblast, 12.1 in Moscow, 10.4 in Lvov Oblast and 9.2 percent in Latvia (we did not include Primorskiy Kray due to the small number of persons questioned but there 63 percent mentioned hashish among the consumed drugs). Thus, if we compare Tashkent and Latvia, in the Uzbek capital, hashish was mentioned among the consumed drugs by 6.5-fold more persons questioned than in Latvia. This is not surprising since Central Asia, as is known, has its own raw material source for manufacturing this drug and it is less accessible in other places. As for morphine, it was mentioned as the most widespread in Lvov Oblast with 54.2 percent, Latvia with 38.5 percent, Gorkiy Oblast with 38.2 percent, in Moscow by 30.3 percent, in Tashkent by 16.7, in Stavropol Kray by 14.3, in Primorskiy Kray by 3.7 and in Novosibirsk Oblast by no one. Here, in addition to such a broad range, one is struck by

another important circumstance: of the drugs used in our nation, morphine is the strongest and very quickly causes a pathologic addiction and for this reason those persons questioned who admitted to the taking of this drug are real candidates for chronic addicts. The distribution of this drug among our young respondents gives a most malevolent slant to the problem.

Thus, the student youth, at least a portion of it which we questioned, rather extensively uses drugs, including morphine, the most perfidious of all those found in the USSR. Are the young people aware of the danger to which they are exposing themselves? The research has shown that the students are rather well informed on the consequences of drug abuse. Thus, 90.7 percent of them were certain that drugs had a harmful effect on human health, 70.1 percent felt that they led to the degeneration of the individual. Some 62 percent of all those questioned considered drug addiction to be an illness, 37.7 percent felt it was a bad habit and 4.3 percent found it difficult to answer. Some 5.9 percent considered a drug addict to be a normal person, 44 percent considered him ill, 46.5 percent morally dissolute and 19.9 percent a criminal.

Finally, the young men and women were asked the question "What is the danger at present of the widespread use of drugs among the students?" It turned out that 50.9 percent considered this danger very significant, 22.1 percent significant, 4.6 percent not very significant, 3.0 percent insignificant, 0 did not see any danger, 17.8 percent found it difficult to reply and 1.6 percent did not reply. Thus, 73 percent of those questioned, or almost 3/4, felt that the spread of drugs in the youth represents a real danger. The replies to this question were almost identical in all regions where the research was conducted and this significantly increases the degree of reliability of the obtained results. Unfortunately, we do not have any grounds not to share the opinion of those questioned as if anyone knows what is happening among them it is the young men and women themselves. It is well known that no one advertises their consumption of drugs and this, as a rule, is well concealed from the outside eye, particularly among juveniles and the youth, where at times there is an atmosphere of mistrust of adults, even their own parents and close friends.

The research clearly showed that for the student youth, in addition to alcoholic beverages and drugs, the abuse of toxic substances is also a serious problem. To begin with, the youth are well-informed about the problem. To the question "Have you heard of the abuse of toxic substances among the student youth?" more than 1/2 of those questioned (51.8 percent) replied affirmatively. The proportional amount of those answering in this manner in Latvia was 47.1 percent, in Primorskiy Kray 54.2 percent, in Stavropol Kray 59.6 percent, in Gorkiy Oblast 62.5 percent, in Novosibirsk Oblast 50 percent, in Lvov Oblast 40 percent, in Moscow 50.9 percent and in Tashkent 50.4 percent. The question was asked of precisely these informed respondents of to what degree, in their opinion, this phenomenon was widespread. The



answers were distributed in the following manner: 9.4 percent indicated very widely, 37.4 percent said widely and 53.2 percent not very widely. Thus, almost 1/2 of those questioned, 46.8 percent, feels that the use of toxic substances among students has wide or even very wide distribution. Characteristically here, the proportional amount of those questioned affirming such an opinion was high in all regions and was everywhere approximately 40-50 percent.

Of the toxic substances used among the youth, the respondents mentioned the following: glue 63.9 percent, benzine 63.9 percent, acetone 55 percent, dichlophos 37 percent, dyes 27.6 percent, chloroform 11.8 percent, brake fluid 10 percent, antifreeze 3.4 percent and other 5.7 percent. To the question "Do you know for certain about instances of the use of toxic substances by your friends, comrades and acquaintances?" some 23.9 percent answered affirmatively, 73.7 percent answered negatively and 2.4 percent did not reply. Moreover, 14 percent of all those questioned indicated that they personally had been in sessions where toxic substances were employed: in 70.8 percent of the cases it was glue, 52.7 percent benzine and 35.9 percent acetone.

The researchers approached the main question with great caution: Were our respondents able to try toxic substances? The reply obtained was stunning: 9.8 percent admitted that they had tried toxic substances. It was particularly alarming that the proportional amount of those questioned who admitted this, although varying, was high in all regions. It was 17.7 percent in Gorkiy Oblast, 13.6 percent in the Primorskiy Kray, 12.5 percent in Stavropol Kray, 11.1 percent in Novosibirsk Oblast, 8.3 percent in Moscow, 8.0 percent in Tashkent, 7.3 percent in Latvia and 5.8 percent in Lvov Oblast. Thus, although the data for the regions differ, the indicators are very high. Certainly it is a question of the taking of substances the use of which is unnatural and strange not only for physically and mentally immature young men and women but also for obvious drunks and alcoholics (as is known, precisely they more frequently use glue, benzine and acetone in the absence of alcohol).

These data give us the right to conclude that among the students of the general education secondary schools and the PTU, the degree of not only alcohol and drug abuse is catastrophically high, but the same is true, if it can be so said, for substance abuse and this requires an immediate response.

Now let us endeavor to determine the number of students in the secondary schools and PTU who at present possibly habitually used toxic substances. Let us employ the same method as in the instance with drugs. Some 9.8 percent of those who tried would be 572 persons. The number of all the students in the 8th-10th (11th) grades and the students in the PTU, as was already pointed out, is 15.19 million. Then 9.8 percent of them would be approximately 1.5 million. As in the case with drugs, let us divide this figure by half. Even if one out of two of those questioned had consciously tried to maintain his

reputation, nevertheless 750,000 students in the general education secondary schools and the PTU had already been able to try toxic substances. We do not know how many young people, having taken toxic substances once or several times in their lives, subsequently would become inveterate substance abusers but if an analogy is drawn with the use of drugs (1 out of 8-10), then it turns out that from the current students of the schools and PTU over the next few years there will be at least 75,000 who fill out the ranks of substance abusers. These substances even in a short interval of time can be destructive for any organism and particularly an immature one.

Of the young persons who admitted that they had tried toxic substances, 38.5 percent had used glue, 28.7 percent benzine, 17.8 percent acetone, 7.5 percent dichlophos, 6.5 percent dyes, 3.1 percent chlorophos, 1.7 percent antifreeze and 14.7 percent other ones. Thus, glue, benzine and acetone are the most popular in this group. We asked the question of how frequently our respondents were able to try toxic substances and we received the following answers: 3.5 percent systematically, 1.0 percent very often, 4.4 percent often, 7.3 percent not very often, 17.5 percent rarely, 57.5 percent very rarely and 8.8 percent did not reply. Thus, for 33.7 percent of those questioned, or 1/3, the use of toxic substances is not an isolated instance in life but a more or less regular or even a rare occupation and this certainly aggravates the situation.

On the regional level the picture is so similar that one can speak certainly of a high degree of reliability in the obtained information. Also very similar is the situation in all the regions over the degree of awareness of the danger of toxic substance abuse. To the question "Do you feel that toxic substances have a harmful influence on human health?" some 89.7 percent answered affirmatively, 3.1 percent replied negatively, 6.4 percent found it difficult to answer and 0.8 percent did not reply. The proportional amount of persons who answered the question affirmatively was approximately the same in all the regions and varied within limits from 92.8 percent (Latvia) to 82 percent (Moscow). Some 63.2 percent felt that toxic substances led to the degeneration of the individual, 12.7 percent did not feel this way, 22.5 percent found it difficult to answer and 1.6 percent did not reply. Some 47.4 percent considered toxic substance abuse to be an illness and 53.2 percent felt it a bad habit. Again, the obtained data are rather evenly spread throughout all the regions. To the question of what sort of person was a substance abuser, those questioned replied in the following manner: 6.5 percent said a normal man, 45.7 percent said he was sick, 33.6 percent said he was morally dissolute, 11.7 percent considered him a criminal and 2.5 percent felt otherwise. A predominant majority understood the danger of using toxic substances. Some 37.9 percent of all those questioned saw a very significant danger in this, 27.6 percent felt it was significant, 7.8 percent not very significant, 4.7 percent found this insignificant, 1.3 percent did not see

any danger, 18.4 percent found it difficult to answer and 2.3 percent did not reply. Thus, 65.5 percent of all those questioned viewed the spread of toxic substance abuse among the student youth as a serious social danger. Again the data for the regions are very close in value.

In the course of the research, we ascertained which of the two evils were considered the greater by the youth: drug addiction or toxic substance abuse. In terms of the degree of social danger, 43.8 percent of those questioned put drug addiction in first place, 28.8 percent put toxic substance abuse, 24.6 percent were unable to give a definite answer and 2.8 percent did not reply. This is not surprising since the question is rather complex. It is interesting that in answering it, the respondents in all the regions, with the exception of Primorskiy Kray, showed unanimity putting the danger of drug addiction for society in first place.

Thus, in summing up what we have said, it must be admitted that in the nation an extremely alarming situation has arisen in the sense of the introduction of alcohol, drugs and toxic substances among the student youth and that to our great regret we still have not been able to adequately realize, correctly assess and analyze this situation. We all still show an unforgivable or even criminal negligence when confronted with the enormous danger threatening our youth and the alarm must be rung. Of the students questioned by us in the 8th-10th (11th) grades and the students of the PTU in the 1st-3d year of instruction (the age of 93.2 percent of them was 14-17 years and 1/2 was girls), 52.8 percent with one or another frequency consumed alcoholic beverages, 10.2 percent had tried drugs at least once in their life and 9.8 percent had tried toxic substances! Seemingly, no one is amazed by the data related to the consumption of alcoholic beverages by the under-age youth in our nation where drunkenness and alcoholism have flourished over the decades and cannot be opposed by anything except the long repudiated "dry" or "semidry" law. Fathers have drunk and do drink, grandfathers and great grandfathers drank and they did not die at least immediately, and for this reason it would be difficult to protect the younger generation against this evil without a radical change in our entire way of life.

But drugs and toxic substances are a completely different thing. Their consumption is absolutely unnatural and lethal at any age and particularly in youth. And if it is remembered that in the nation there are approximately 750,000 (plus or minus 100,000) students who at the age of 14-17 years at least once tried drugs and the same number has tried toxic substances, it is not hard to imagine the disaster which will soon confront our society. Even if only 1 out of 10 begins systematic use of drugs and toxic substances, this is already an entire army of drug addicts and toxic substance abusers (let us recall that at present in the USSR not more than 130,000 drug addicts and drug users are officially registered and the number of toxic substance abusers is unknown to us).

If we add to this that drug addiction and toxic substance abuse might be compared with an iceberg, the invisible, underwater portion of which significantly surpasses the visible, one can understand what serious problems confront us. For now the efforts directed at preventing and stopping the use of drugs and toxic substances among the youth are completely inadequate and this is rather self-deception if not a conscious hogwash. At the same time, there is at present (although still on paper) a rather effective system for preventing the use of drugs and toxic substances but for implementing this the forces of the USSR MVD, the USSR Ministry of Health and the USSR State Committee for Public Education are completely insufficient. For this reason, at present the main task consists not so much in overcoming the existing stereotypes, although this is certainly important, as a significant and manifold increase in the financing and material-technical support for measures to overcome these phenomena. We have endeavored to show just how real and great the danger is.

#### Footnote

1. Here and below in analogous places it was possible to indicate several positions and for this reason the total amount is over 100 percent.

#### Bibliography

1. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR za 70 let: Yubileynyy statisticheskiy yezhegodnik" [The USSR National Economy in 70 Years: Jubilee Statistical Annual], Moscow, 1987, p 528.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya", 1990.

#### Organized Juvenile Crime

915D0003F Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 90 (signed to  
press 6 Aug 90) pp 92-98

[Article by Boris Yakovlevich Petelin, candidate of legal sciences and docent at the Academy of the USSR MVD. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] The state of crime is one of the indicators for the quality of social life. The occurring democracy and glasnost have raised in a new light the question of the control of society over the state of crime and the combating of it. The criminal statistics are now public. Scientific work is becoming more active and this meets the practical requirements of society. In the nation there has been a noticeable increase in the crime rate, including among juveniles. Their share among the law-breakers at present is 15 percent in comparison with 10 percent several years ago. A quantitative rise has been recorded in juvenile crime. For the nation in 1989, this increased by 21 percent. But the main thing has been the qualitative changes which are observed in juvenile crime.

It has been officially recognized that organized crime exists in the nation. However, the designated view does not extend to youth crime. At the same time, almost 40 percent of the infractions by juveniles currently have an organized, group nature. The law enforcement bodies do not always disclose all participants in criminal groups and the organizers and "ideologists" often escape criminal liability. There has also been a change in the social characteristics and structure of the groups of juvenile lawbreakers. At present, they consist not of 3 or 5 persons, as was the case yesterday, but of 50, 100 and more persons. Let me refer merely to the example of Kazan. In recent years, juveniles have committed 180 group crimes, including 50 cases of mass brawls "side against side," using knives, homemade weapons and "equipment." As a result, 26 persons were killed and 200 injured. In the Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan, several hundred criminal juvenile groups have been discovered.

The factor of "organized force" and numerical superiority make it possible for the juvenile groupings (seven-five against one) fearlessly (without encountering resistance from the victim) and with impunity (criminal liability is improbable) to commit bold assaults, thefts, hooliganistic actions and apartment robberies. As a result, there have been alarming facts. At the end of the 1980s, the nation's law enforcement bodies encountered an unforeseen social phenomenon of organized juvenile crime.

Characteristic in this regard are the cases involving "raids against Moscow" and organized by outsider youth groups. As a rule, they arrive in the capital in the morning. They immediately begin their "bombing" making assaults on Moscow contemporaries. In their words, these crimes fit into a "simple scheme": they choose the victim, surround him with the group, create a "force field" and propose the "exchange" of costly items such as jeans, jackets and caps for their "rags." If the victim puts up resistance, we "suppress" him with our numerical superiority and when need be use a knife or "other equipment."

Many of them are under investigation (at their homes). But benefiting from the fact that "recognizance not to leave" has been applied against them as a measure to secure appearance, they leave for the capital and commit new crimes. And their reasons are simple: "the court can count but it does not add." And as strange as it may seem, they are right. In actuality, according to the law (Article 41 of the RSFSR Criminal Code), the courts employ the "principle of absorption." A person who has committed scores of crimes is actually punished only for one of them, the severest. But punishment for the remainder will be "added in" to this term, that is, the "remainder" are actually unpunished. As we see, the "gaps" in the law are quickly taken advantage of by the juvenile lawbreakers.

In virtually all regions of the nation, they have discovered criminogenic youth groupings with a varying degree

of organization. In Tataria and Mordovia these are called "offices." They are formed at the place of study, residence or employment. As a rule, their actions are of a single, situational nature. But there are also other groups which are criminal packs in which the juveniles are members along with adults. In contrast to the offices the packs ("risk" or "business" and other groups) have an antisocial focus as well as their own organization and treasury or "obshchag" from which they finance those who are in prison or a hospital as well as funerals "for their own members." These are headed by a leader who, as a rule, is 19-22 years old. Then come the "elders" ("fighters") who are 16-18 years. Then the "husks" ["shelukha"] who are juveniles 14-15 years of age. These groupings also have their own "ideologists" who assert that the "office" and other "risk groups" are for "real men" so that they can feel to be "real persons." Certainly the juveniles have a hard time as at home the parents abuse them and at school it is the teacher. But the "office" protects them and provides an opportunity to "test themselves" in playing "adult games with rigid rules."

The activities of the offices and packs are controlled by the "brain," that is, the leader or the "ideologists" who themselves do not participate in criminal actions. The task of the "brain" is to find the object of attack, to work out an "operational plan," to instruct the members of the pack in how to successfully "carry out the operation" and conceal the traces of the crime, and how to behave in the event of "falling" into an investigation or the court.

There is rigid discipline in the organized criminal youth groups with the rule "one misstep and you are on your own." The answer is "I know nothing, there is no group, I was acting alone." In the course of the investigation the "group" conducts its own counterinvestigation. In the morning, they hold "planning sessions" with those summoned by the investigator. In the evening they discuss the evidence of the victims, the witnesses and work out a plan for "how to get around the law" and escape responsibility. For these purposes, they widely use special literature designed for the employees of the law enforcement bodies. Thus, in a search of the members of a youth gang they discovered a "manual for investigators," literature on forensic psychiatry and psychology and the video film "Warriors" (made in the United States) in which the youth gangs were presented as the supporters of justice.

The juvenile lawbreakers work out ahead of time the line of their conduct in the investigation and in the court. The replies to the investigations are rigidly determined by the view of not coming into contact with the investigators. Even juveniles who have suffered severe bodily injury (a knife wound in the stomach, a shovel blow to the head) did not name their assailants to the investigators. This category of juveniles (they occur in the cases as victims) in interrogations reply in a very monosyllabic manner: "I am to blame for everything myself," "I do not have any enemies" or "I do not want to have a record."



There has been a noticeable swing to the negative in the attitude of juvenile witnesses to carrying out their civil duties as witnesses. The reason is clear as they are afraid of retribution by the offices or gangs. Thus, the juvenile Svetlana T. said that she had seen who fired at the victim, but categorically refused to identify the firer or give evidence since she was afraid of "being maimed or killed." There are more and more such "witnesses." As a whole, the public attitude toward the activities of the law enforcement and particularly the investigatory bodies has changed to the negative as the workers here are considered to be bad "detectives," nonprofessionals and even rogues.

There have been frequent instances when the juvenile members of gangs threaten the victims or witnesses with physical violence, apartment arson, a pogrom and so forth. The "centers" of the criminal gangs consciously erect obstacles for the investigation and court in establishing the truth of the case. Thus, in taking advantage of the processes of the humanization of the social and legal institutions in the nation, the defendants who are gang members loudly proclaim "pressure from the investigators" or the "violating" of their right to defense in the investigation. The criminal groups work out special "letters" and "instructions" which state that "there would not be any problems" for the juveniles. As a result, the nation's law enforcement bodies have encountered new social motivation in the conduct in the investigation and court by the juvenile participants in the case both as victims and witnesses as well as accused and defendants.

Furthermore, among the juveniles new types of crime have appeared and in particular extortion (rackets). In 1989, 165 such criminal cases were investigated. In many instances, the juvenile crimes were "directed" by adult instigators and organizers. As a rule, these are persons with a criminal record. Thus, the juvenile Valeriy P. in the investigation revealed the role of "Uncle Renat," the adult instigator of the crime. And only in the penal colony did he realize that he was under the thumb of "Uncle Renat" who had taught him to steal and sent him out "on the job." But "Uncle Renat" remained at liberty while he, Valeriy, was behind bars.

Among the juvenile lawbreakers there has been a noticeable increase (by 46 percent) in the share of schoolchildren. Some 17 percent of the juvenile lawbreakers are juveniles who are not studying and not employed. One other alarming fact is that in 1989, there was a trebling of the crime rate among girls. The number of drug addicts increased noticeably among them.

The milieu of juvenile lawbreakers is a special stratum in society. Here there is a discussion of their own "juvenile" problems. Thus, under the influence of former convicts, many juveniles feel that they will not "get anything" for the first or second theft. But there is also a different arithmetic. In the city of Frunze, a group of juveniles, in committing thefts, was assured that "there would not be any problem for 17 thefts, but there would

be for the 18th." The organizers within "their own" groups provided "court functions" by so-called "analyses" of the disputes and conflicts and consciously established physical violence and harshness so that the juveniles realized that "there would be no quarter given for violating the laws of the office."

There has been a marked change in the attitude of the juvenile members of organized groups to the law enforcement bodies. Years-long practice of legal impunity and "moral preaching" have done their job and many juvenile lawbreakers are disdainful of the law. They live according to the formula "illegal but beneficial." Thus, in the "business" groups, the young speculators in a day "make more money" than their parents earn in 2 weeks or a month of employment.

Under the new operating conditions, the law enforcement system, including the service for preventing lawbreaking by juveniles, the investigatory bodies and the courts often do not achieve the main social goal of forcing the lawbreaking juvenile to recognize his guilt and not repeat the infraction in the future. Impunity for the first (second or third) infraction gives rise to a "criminal clump" in the form of the committing of new infractions by the juveniles and these often remain unpunished.

And of course it is no accident that for juveniles who participate in the "risk groups" and "offices" the words of parents and teachers seem "naive and simply confused" as do the legal measures which "threaten" them by the criminal law. In going through "schooling" in their criminal groupings, they do not fear either the investigation or the courts or those who can "lock them up" (arrest them) and condemn them. For this, it turns out, they are already morally prepared.

Naturally the question arises of how the investigators are to act under the new conditions. What is being done to expose as well as quickly and effectively investigate each crime committed by juveniles?

It has been over 10 years now since the internal affairs bodies inherited juvenile affairs. At that time, it seemed to the lawyers that the bringing together in the USSR MVD of all state functions related to combating juvenile crime including preventive (the inspectorates for juvenile affairs), search (criminal search), investigatory and corrective-educational, would make it possible to erect rather dependable "defensive bastions" in the fight against juvenile crime. Alas, it must be stated with regret that life has overturned these hopes. The "scissors" between the "state" of juvenile crime and the "state of combating" it has not been reduced but has even grown in recent years.

Over the last decade, the "gross" youth crime rate has risen by 28 percent and continues to rise. Registered with the inspectorates for juvenile affairs are 900,000 persons and almost 240,000 parents from broken families. Some 15 percent of the regular investigators of the internal affairs bodies are engaged in investigating juvenile cases.

The unabating increase in the crime among the youth is one of the most acute social problems in society. Thus, in Kazakhstan and the Central Asian Republics, 1 out of every 11 juveniles living there has been involved in criminal liability.

At present, it is clear to everyone that legal, that is force actions, are not capable of eliminating juvenile crime. The law enforcement bodies cannot eliminate the causes of this. And the presence of causes leads to the reproduction of crime. There has been merely the periodic "abatement" and "dissipation" but not the disappearance of the juvenile criminal groups. Increased effectiveness in the work of each investigator and each investigatory subunit for juvenile affairs is a real contribution to increasing the social protection of the Soviet citizens against criminal actions; it contributes to restoring social justice violated by the criminal event by returning to the victims the caused material, physical and moral harm as well as by disclosing the personal guilt of the accused as a necessary prerequisite for their just punishment.

It must be said outright that investigation at present is encountering numerous difficulties in juvenile affairs. The first is the unforgivable indifference of the parents of the juveniles. Many of them feel that fights of juveniles and "side against side" have always existed and will exist. There is nothing unusual in this. At the same time, an analysis of criminal cases leads to the firm conclusion that it is essential with all the force of society to debunk the cult of naked physical force and the "law of the fist." Frequently the reverse occurs and the newspaper publications contribute to this. For example, an article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA entitled "The Kazan Syndrome" contributed to the organizing of "courtyard teams" of juveniles in Pavlodar (Kazakhstan), as well as the "flexing of muscles," "the dividing of territory" and the "settling of scores."

The plot line of juvenile cases is usually simple. But the group nature of these cases poses difficult questions for the investigation particularly in proving the guilt of a juvenile. In the investigation and court the juvenile lawbreakers, without denying the fact of committing the crime, often do not recognize their own personal guilt. The "dispute over guilt" determines the entire content of the investigation and the trial.

Why does this happen? What patterns are at work here? Certain authors link such a form of self-defense with the presence of a particular system of values in the juveniles [1]. Others link this to facts of the "neutralization" of generally accepted social (including legal) standards of conduct among the juveniles [2]. The social aspect of a group crime remains insufficiently studied. What is the basis for the formation and contacts in the criminal groups: is it in the search for criminal "romance," in the general selfish focus of interests or "compatible forms of protection," or even the "joint doing of business"? Why is such motivation highly regarded by the youth? What is the criminogenic role of risk as a group emotional

experience of the juveniles? These and other factors determine the activities of the juvenile groups.

In order for a juvenile who has committed a crime to begin the process of rehabilitation, he should first of all be aware of his guilt and repent for what he has done. In the course of the investigation, there is the overcoming of the active antisocial mind set of the juvenile (among the "activists") or his social infantilism, when he acted "like everyone else" and "together with the others." The task of disclosing the motives and the real subjective mechanism of the criminal actions becomes not only a legal one but also is socially significant. This determines the "personal guilt" and "personal responsibility" and is of primary socioprophylactic significance.

The next problem is the question of concentrating the forces of investigation and the operational workers on exposing the group cases. For example, in Karaganda during the year 199 group crimes by juveniles were committed. The juvenile criminal groups numbered from 8 to 27 members. In order to keep within the legally established 2-month period of investigation, the task was set of allocating the necessary forces for carrying this out. The amount of work determined the necessity of establishing large investigatory and investigatory-operational groups for each group crime. However, the quantity of multiple and group cases of juveniles has grown. But the investigatory apparatus in a number of regions is beginning to "peter out." The quality of investigation is dropping.

It is time to provide answers to a number of other fundamental questions related to juvenile crime. First of all, to the question: Does one really expect positive results from "female prevention"? This question is tied to the paradoxical fact that a large portion of the multi-thousand corps of co-workers in the previous inspectorates for juvenile affairs (IDN) and now the service for the prevention of juvenile and youth violations are women. The "individual preventive work" carried out by them evokes a smile among the juvenile lawbreakers. On the social level, this preventive work is ineffective as around 50 percent of the juveniles registered with the IDN commit crimes again.

There are also doubts as to the "preventive methods" carried out by this service. In the view of the juveniles, there is the predominance of "trying to persuade the children" and their parents. It could scarcely be otherwise. Certainly the inspectors of the preventive work are the same pedagogues. They do not have legal knowledge. Nor do they know the theory of crime prevention (criminology). Thus, we are again involved with a "repetition" of what we have already gone through, namely insufficient professional competence. The question has arisen of incorporating the entire "IDN army" in the practical work of disclosing and preventing the activities of the juvenile groups established to commit crimes. The presently existing dispersion of functional duties in this

service instead of their concentration in the future does not guarantee successful prevention of organized juvenile crime.

Also low is the professionalism of exposing and investigating crimes by the personnel of criminal search and investigation. Moreover, they continue to lose qualified personnel since the greatest official and psychophysiological stresses in combating crime fall on the workers of criminal search and investigation. The personnel cannot endure this "terrestrial" stress. At the same time, the creation of a professional searcher or professional investigator takes more than a year or two. Simultaneously, the prestige of these occupations has declined not without help from the mass information media. And as a result among the MVD investigators specialized in juvenile affairs, 30 percent are new persons who do not have sufficient work experience. Naturally, such composition of the investigators tells on the quality of investigating juvenile crimes. Here is an example. According to the estimates of scientists, up to 40 percent of the information of importance for a case is lost by slipping between criminal search and investigation. The reasons lie in the professional failings and flaws.

Criminal practice on juvenile affairs is characterized by the following indicators. In the course of the investigation almost 50 percent of the juveniles are freed of criminal liability. Here we must also add parole and probation which are handed down by the courts. And it turns out that only one-third of the juvenile lawbreakers is subjected to real punishment. This scarcely corresponds to the modern demands of combating juvenile crime. Moreover, in practice there have been repeated instances when the juveniles commit crimes even in the course of the investigation. Just imagine: the investigator is hard at work establishing previous criminal facts while the juveniles, in going out of the investigator's office, commit new crimes.

How can one handle organized juvenile crime? How is it possible to lead them away from the "criminal romance" of criminal groups which they call "risk groups"? What can we do so that their conduct conforms to the law? Unfortunately, there are no concrete answers for these questions coming either from our social scientists, the internal affairs bodies or the procurator's office. In the meanwhile, time does not stand still. While the legislators and law enforcement bodies are "vacillating," juvenile crime continues to grow.

Of course, there is an aggregate of economic and social factors which rest at the base of the growth of the organized forms of juvenile crime. However, it is a question of the present abilities of the law enforcement bodies to check and overcome youth crime. There are positive examples of this. For instance, in Kazan recently it has been possible to seriously rectify the situation in juvenile cases and to discover and bring to justice scores of the "leaders" of the criminal groups. For 45 juveniles the courts have cancelled paroles. And the

police is keeping the others under surveillance. They have felt this and have calmed down.

Parent patrols in the morning and evening have been instituted in the schools. Work groups have been set up from police workers (the prevention service) with the participation of workers from the city procurator's office. They invite to these the "leaders" of the juvenile groups with their parents, the classroom leaders and district police inspector. An official warning (by signed receipt) is issued to the "leader" and his parents. In this manner it has been possible to neutralize the activities of 30 courtyard "leaders." Upon receipt of warnings of the concentration of juvenile groups in front of the discotheques or on the way to them, the quick response forces are employed. This made it possible to prevent a number of mass brawls. In Kazan a constant search is underway for new forms and methods of combating organized juvenile crime. Thus, for preventive purposes, many participants in the juvenile groups have been videotaped. This has facilitated the making of identifications with the development of criminal cases.

But here also new problems arise as the influx of "new recruits" who are younger, some 13-15 years of age into the juvenile groups has not dried up. This is a serious problem for sociologists, for the republic committee for combating crime and for the law enforcement bodies. Here also is something to think about for the deputies of the Supreme Soviet and the local soviets.

Of course, the workers of the law enforcement bodies realize that it is impossible to protect the youth against various sorts of antisocial influences. However, a more fundamental sociological study of these questions and the providing of scientific recommendations of a practical sort should become the basis for a coordinated and well-planned organization for the work of the preventive service, criminal search, investigation, the procurator's bodies and the courts in intensifying the struggle against organized juvenile crime. This is also the purpose of the comprehensive program for combating organized crime adopted by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. All the "levers" of the law enforcement bodies must be utilized fully, and there must be a regrouping of their ranks and preventive ties with the schools, PTU [vocational-technical school], with the families of juveniles, the Komsomol and with the public in order to bring about a fundamental change in this activity.

#### Bibliography

1. Ratinov, A.R., Yefremova, G.D., "Psychological Defense and Self-Justification in the Genesis of Criminal Conduct," "Lichnost prestupnika kak obyekts psikhologicheskogo issledovaniya" [The Personality of the Criminal as an Object of Psychological Research], Moscow, 1979, pp 47-49.
2. Kurganov, S.I., "Motives of Action in Juvenile Lawbreakers," SOTSIOLOG. ISSLED., No 5, 1989, p 60.



COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya", 1990.

### Education and Life Expectancy of Urban Dwellers of Kazakhstan


915D0003G Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 90 (signed to  
press 6 Aug 90) pp 98-101

[Article by David Zakharovich Borkhov, doctor of medical sciences and professor at the Chimkent Pedagogical Institute. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] As is known, educational level to a significant degree controls the nature of a person's labor activity and his place in social production as well as the range of cultural and social needs. In turn, working and living conditions as well as sanitary and hygienic habits have a substantial impact not only on the nature and spread of individual illnesses but also on the mortality level and average life expectancy of the population [1]. In this context, one could give a comparative analysis between the educational level, mortality rate and average life expectancy for the corresponding population groups.

According to the data of the last All-Union Population Census concerning the age-sex composition of the urban inhabitants of Kazakhstan and their educational level, out of every 1,000 persons of the employed population in 1978-1979, 134 had a higher and incomplete higher education, 183 had a specialized secondary education, 284 had a general secondary education, 250 had an incomplete secondary education and 125 persons had a primary education [2].

With a drop in educational qualification, the standardized indicators of mortality in these groups increased by almost double. Here this dependence is more expressed for men than for women. The mortality indicators for persons having a higher and secondary education increase proportionately to age. Here the mortal level for persons having a higher and incomplete higher education is lower than for persons with a secondary education. Persons with an incomplete secondary and primary education at an age under 35 years perish and die 3-4-fold more frequently than in the other groups (see the diagram). It must be pointed out that in the interval of 20-35 years, up to 80 percent of all the causes of death are due to accidents, poisonings and injuries. An analysis of the circumstances leading the victims to fatality (from the materials of the forensic medical examinations) has shown that in 78 percent of the cases, the abuse of alcohol is the direct or indirect reason for the accident. There is an expressed correlation between the educational level and average life expectancy. With the



Age indicators for mortality rate of urban population in Kazakhstan in 1978-79 depending upon education level (per 100,000 of the population)

existing level of age mortality, the life of persons having a higher and incomplete higher education will be an average of 9.2 years longer than for persons with a primary education; for men this difference is more significant than for women (respectively, 10.1 and 8.1 years). Of the persons with a higher and incomplete higher education, 73.4 percent of the men and 90.1 percent of the women will survive until pension age. For persons with a general secondary and specialized secondary education, the value of these indicators is somewhat lower: 64.6 percent and 65.4 percent respectively for men and 85.5 percent and 88.5 percent for women. For those who have an incomplete secondary education, this figure drops to 56.9 percent for men and 84.3 percent for women, while for persons with a primary education the value of the indicator becomes minimal: less than  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the men and only  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the women will survive to pension age (Table 1).

**Table 1: Average Life Expectancy of Urban Population Having Differing Educational Level**

Education Level	Average Life Expectancy, years			Number of Persons Living to Beginning of Pension Age, %		
	Men	Women	Both Sexes	Men	Women	Both Sexes
Higher and incomplete higher	63.2	71.1	67.1	73.4	90.1	81.5
Specialized secondary	60.0	68.8	64.3	65.4	88.5	76.6
General secondary	60.1	73.5	66.6	64.6	85.5	75.1
Incomplete secondary	57.7	65.6	61.5	56.9	84.3	70.2
Primary	53.1	63.0	57.9	45.7	72.2	58.6

Mortality in working age, in reducing the participation of the public in the production process, causes significant harm to society. On a national scale, a 1 percent reduction in the working-age population participating in social production is the equivalent of losing some 5.8 billion rubles of national income. As educational level declines, the volume of labor losses caused by premature mortality increases by more than 3-fold.

With age, the amplitude in the fluctuation of the number of years of average life expectancy in persons with a

differing educational level gradually is smoothed out, reaching its minimum among those surviving to the age of 55 and then the gap between the indicators again begins to grow. However, beginning with the age of 55, persons having a secondary education and a specialized secondary education move to the forefront in terms of average life expectancy. In the elderly age groups (beginning at the age of 65) in terms of average life expectancy in second place are persons with an incomplete secondary and primary education, moving those with a higher education into third place (Table 2).

**Table 2: Average Life Expectancy for Persons Having Differing Education Level and Surviving to a Certain Age\***

Education Level	Average Number of Years of Remaining Life for Persons Surviving to the Age of:									
	25 Years	30 Years	35 Years	40 Years	45 Years	50 Years	55 Years	60 Years	65 Years	70 Years
Higher and incomplete higher	46.1	40.7	36.0	31.3	26.7	22.3	18.1	14.1	10.1	6.4
General secondary and specialized secondary	43.9	39.3	34.7	30.3	26.1	22.2	18.7	15.5	12.5	10.1
Incomplete secondary and primary	40.1	36.5	32.8	28.7	24.6	20.7	16.9	13.4	10.4	7.4

\* Indicators have been standardized for sex.

The designated features in the dynamics of average life expectancy for persons with a differing educational level to a significant degree can be explained by data on the structure for the causes of age mortality. After the age of 50, illnesses of the circulatory organs begin to assume a dominant place in the spectrum of the causes of mortality. A negative influence of many factors causing these illnesses (insufficient physical stress, hypodynamia, excess weight, increased neuropsychic loads, stress and so forth) is more inherent to a way of life for persons with a higher education engaged predominantly in mental labor than for the way of life of the other population groups.

#### Bibliography

1. Lando, M.E., "The Interaction Between Health and Education," *SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN*, Vol 38, No 12, 1975, pp 16-23.

2. "Chislennost i sostav naseleniya SSSR (po dannym Vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1979 godu)" [The Size and Composition of the USSR Population (According to Data of the All-Union 1979 Population Census)], Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1984.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Sotsiologicheskoye issledovaniya", 1990.

#### The Concept of Recreation Sociology

915D0003H Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 90 (signed to press 6 Aug 90) pp 102-106

[Article by Aleksandr Sergeyevich Orlov, candidate of philosophical sciences and deputy chairman of the Executive Committee of the Sukhumi Municipal Soviet. Our journal has published his article "Seasonal Fluctuations in the Size and Composition of the Population of a Resort Zone" (No 3, 1986)]

[Text] In the 20th Century, significant social changes have become apparent in the sphere of free time. The provided free time has given a previously unprecedented opportunity for satisfying the recreational needs of people. The "leisure industry" has begun to develop rapidly. Leisure in all its forms has become a mass phenomenon.

The leisure industry is a sphere of the economy that is enormous in its scale. Each year in all the nations of the world, up to 200 billion dollars of profit are earned from tourist services (in third place after the sale of oil and motor vehicles). The growth rate here has averaged 4 percent a year and by the end of the century, this sector should emerge in first place [1]. Clearly, this sphere urgently requires the attention of sociologists.

The developed countries are most seriously concerned with improving the conditions and quality of leisure for their citizens. In part we also have such a program and here we have in mind the corresponding sections of the Comprehensive Program for the Development of the Production of Consumer Goods and the Service Sphere [2]. However, this has been marked by half-heartedness and a poor linkage with the realities of our life and the nation's economy. The most vulnerable point in the program is the eclectic method by which the problems of the recreational complex are to be solved. By the year 2000, the increase in the volume of services for organized leisure should increase by 2.3-2.5-fold [2, p 44]. Is this good or bad? We are concerned by the fact that the unit of measurement here is volume, that is, the notorious "gross" which can easily be reached by hiking the rates for services without improving their quality and assortment. According to the data of the USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics], at present around 50 million persons a year rest in 15,400 recreational facilities. Around 30 million children and juveniles spend their vacations in Pioneer camps and recreation facilities [3, p 602]. However, for tourist travel demand as yet is only 27 percent satisfied [3, p 603]. For many years, there has been a shortage of recreational services and they have been marked by poor quality.

Although our nation possesses enormous recreational potential, this national wealth has been utilized to an insignificant degree. There is an acute shortage of recreational zones. The forecasts of their development made by specialists are not too promising. Thus it has been estimated that up to 1 percent of the nation's territory would be needed for organizing leisure zones according to the standards in effect in the USSR. But, in the first place, in line with the granting of full independence to the republics, there are doubts that those which do have the required natural conditions would want to develop their own recreational facilities planned for the entire nation. Secondly, the designated area is just 0.2 million km<sup>2</sup> and period cally 1/2 of the USSR population will be concentrated on this "spot." Under such conditions, leisure would scarcely be termed normal. Let us turn to American sources. There the total area of recreational zones exceeds 75 million hectares, that is, 0.3 of a

hectare per inhabitant of the nation [4, p 4]. Although in both examples the calculation has been made using different methods, the ratio is rather clear.

The problems and contradictions of recreation have virtually not been studied. Little is known about the population of the recreation zones. And the vacationer himself? Who is he, what are his orientations, interests and requirements during the vacation period? Why have various types of recreation been turned into established models of recreational behavior and what is the contradiction between the real model of recreational behavior and the optimum? What, finally, are the social patterns of the recreational processes and phenomena? For many questions there are no answers.

Recreation is one of the main types of human activity. It is inseparably linked to productive labor and both these types of human activity cannot be viewed in isolation from one another. Due to the absence of a complete and comprehensive notion of recreation as a subject of study, its boundaries are very hazy. Thus, social geography studies recreation as a specific function of a certain socioterritorial community, as a manifestation of the geographic factor in the social organization of a territory. An economist is interested in recreation as an area of economic activity, as an economic sector which is encompassed by the sphere of social services. Social psychology sees in recreation primarily the action of certain psychological mechanisms of human behavior and leisure motivation. The specialists in social medicine, the sociology of leisure and so forth have a unique notion of recreation.

Of course, on the basis of a close alliance of sociologists with economists, resortologists, psychologists and other specialists, it is possible to attempt to investigate the recreation phenomenon more completely and profoundly. However, the elaboration of a qualitatively different methodology is required for a comprehensive study.

Due to the lack of study on the problem, the views set out below do not claim to provide an exhaustive description of the subject but rather should serve as an invitation for further discussion.

We in principle separate the biological form of man's recreational behavior from his sociorecreational activity. Hence, the concepts of biological and social recreation. It is also essential to distinguish the individual form of social recreational activity from its social form. Finally, we propose employing the concept "social recreation" in the broad and narrow sense. In the latter instance, social recreation encompasses only the typical types of recreational activity for modern society (tourism, excursions, sports, passive forms of leisure and so forth). These are carried out in the sectors of the sphere of social services and these can conditionally be termed a single sociorecreational complex (tourist-excursion services, sanatorium-resort, physical culture-recuperative and so forth).



Thus, the subject limits of social recreation as an area of knowledge largely do not coincide with the subject of leisure sociology. The concept of sociorecreational activity is intertwined with the concepts of leisure, the way and style of life, but has a different social content.

The attempts to explain the observed recreational boom merely by the demographic explosion and the increased biological need for recreation are scarcely persuasive. Here one clearly has overlooked the action of social factors which influence the forming of the need for leisure. Among these one can put economic (increased income of the population, the further specialization of labor), sociopsychological (the growing pace of life and the related growth of social tension) and so forth.

The achievements of the scientific and technical revolution provide new opportunities to satisfy the need for a change in activity, its intensity and conditions. These new methods of satisfying recreational needs are becoming more and more accessible. At present in the world, for example, each year tourism involves 1.5 billion persons [1]. Depending upon the models of the way and style of life, one can establish the following groups of recreational processes.

In the generally accepted method of recreational classification, a distinction is drawn between daily, weekly and annual periods of leisure [5, p 7]. Depending upon the time allocated to satisfy recreational needs, they determine not only the periodicity and duration but also the place of spending leisure. Thus, daily leisure is spent within a population point where the person lives and in its amusements and cultural institutions, in the natural landscape zones which are of recreational attraction. The suburbs are basically used for weekly leisure. Annual leave is usually spent in resorts and in leisure and tourism areas.

The Polish researcher Jan Bogusz classifies leisure in the following manner depending upon duration: brief periods (daily), medium (in the form of holidays and days off) and extended periods (annual vacations) [6, p 6]. Such a classification and all the modifications of it are not completely successful as they do not consider the difference of the first and second forms of leisure (in terms of place of residence) from the third (traveling leisure) and also overlook large groups of people. This is important for the space-time change in the conditions of carrying out a person's recreational needs with travel leisure occurs against the background of more profound social changes. At a resort or on trips there is an abrupt change in the conditions of living, social ties and relations and consequently the system of social standards, ideas and expectations. All of this distracts from the customary way of life.

We offer the following classification for the types of recreational activity:

1) Short time (daily, weekly); 2) Long time (annual); 3) Sporadic (absences, unpaid extraordinary leaves, traveling due to family circumstances and so forth).

It must be pointed out that the proposed scheme is greatly oversimplified. For elucidating all the complexity of recreational processes, such a monostructure is not sufficient. For each type of recreational conduct, there are several corresponding established forms for the behavior models of leisure: its intensity, the degree of involvement of natural factors in the recreational conditions, the change in the conditions, way and quality of life, the temporary change in the social and territorial milieu and so forth. For a further typologization of the known and little-known models of recreation and for systematizing the knowledge on the recreational sphere, indispensable to the researcher is a differentiation of the mass of social phenomena and processes observed in studying the volume in terms of different criteria.

Conscious oversimplification and the reduction of the entire complexity of recreational processes to choosing a small number of the most general criteria makes it possible to more clearly define both the basic social groups as well as the typical processes and phenomena. An examination of them from the viewpoint of the recreational criteria helps to unite the diverse forms of human activity into a single system and the observance of this makes it possible to see the main patterns in recreation.

The forms of satisfying recreational needs determine the structure of the organization of mass leisure. Among the types of short-term recreation, in addition to the ones mentioned above, are: engagement in sports and physical culture, walks and passive leisure including sleep, contact with close friends and engaging in a favorite activity, amusement and so forth. To the weekly types of recreational behavior, one should add brief trips not only for tourist, cognitive, exploratory and therapeutic purposes but also to spend time with close friends, carry out one's kinship obligations (a wedding, funeral and so forth).

The long-time type of recreation differs significantly as it possesses a strong regenerative action. This is due to a temporary change in the conditions of everyday residents and is usually for the better. The need for an extended rest which once a year, as a rule, is combined with a vacation lasts from 3 to 8 weeks. But there are social groups the recreational conduct of which lies outside this scheme. Thus, students rest during holiday periods; pensioners depending upon their possibilities, requirements and conditions; those under medical treatment considering the recommendations of physicians and so forth. A particular feature of extended rest is the sharply expressed seasonal nature of recreational conduct. Here two main forms of satisfying recreational needs have been established: travel and resort rest. A tourist usually visits not one locale but rather several and, as a rule, these are leisure zones, although not always resorts.

As for the sporadic recreational processes, the need for such leisure arises when physical or mental fatigue builds

up more rapidly than usual and the customary recreational rhythm of daily life cannot satisfy this.

Even from this brief list it is clear that the types of recreation (short-time and long-time) and forms (sports, tourism, leisure, amusements, preventive medical treatment and resort rest) form a complex nexus. Recreation has given rise to an entire sphere of socioeconomic relations with a particular type of recreational services. The forms of recreation are diverse and they depend upon climatic, geographic, economic and other factors.

However, recreation is not merely rest. Recreational activities serve as an unique "safety valve" for the human organism. Recreation is a natural protective function of the human organism and at the same time a protective reaction of the social body. It makes it possible to preserve the gene pool of mankind and primarily the ethnic gene pool. A miscomprehension of this and a reticence to forecast the possible negative consequences are encountered rather frequently.

Social recreation requires a thorough study. This can be done if all the processes of social recreation are placed in a single scientific area. But at present, procedural studies are lacking and the appropriate information and statistical base does not exist.

Specialists might argue that applied sociological research has been going on and for a long time. Yes, this is true. But the research is restricted to purely practical tasks. Basically, this involves the polling of vacationers and tourists. But there is no study of the recreational processes as a whole. I feel that the time has come to conduct such research, both fundamental and applied. And this should become the main task of recreation sociology. The second task is to work out a general methodological basis for the new scientific area. The sociology of recreation can examine the social processes and phenomena, the actions of groups and individuals in carrying out recreational activities or in forming a demand for this as well as the structures, relations and organizations arising here.

Recreation sociology should bring together on a common methodological basis the knowledge gained by the previously formed related areas of sociological disciplines such as: the sociology of medicine, social planning, sports sociology, leisure sociology, recreational geography and others. This should encompass all areas of organizing travel leisure, including the most mass type, resort. There should be a study made of all the structures and institutions in providing recreational services as well as the recreational potential of the leisure zones.

There must be a special review of the processes occurring in extended travel forms of recreation, the social phenomena observed in satisfying the biological and social needs for resort leisure, the organization of such leisure in recreational zones as well as the social infrastructure of these zones. Such a broadened understanding of long-time leisure is related to the fact that it is difficult to draw a distinction between the two forms of protracted

recreation: tourism and resort leisure. It is difficult to isolate the purely resort zones from the recreational ones. As a rule, these forms of protracted travel leisure supplement one another. An important aspect in studying resort leisure will be disclosing the recreational potential of the leisure zones, as well as working out social standards for its utilization. The social characteristics of vacationers will be of particular value.

This is how we see the main concepts of social recreation and the place which this very important sphere of life in modern society holds. Having briefly set out a general concept of social recreation, we have endeavored to sketch in a system of knowledge dealing with it and the structure of this knowledge. Now it is a question of large-scale research.

### Bibliography

1. "The Most Advantageous Export," *IZVESTIYA*, 5 May 1989.
2. "Kompleksnaya programma razvitiya proizvodstva tovarov narodnogo potrebleniya i sfery uslug na 1986-2000 gody" [Integrated Program for the Development of the Production of Consumer Goods and the Service Sphere for 1986-2000], Moscow, Politizdat, 1985.
3. "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR za 70 let. Yub. stat. yezhegodnik" [The USSR National Economy Over 70 Years. Jubilee Statistical Annual], Moscow, Finansy i Statistika, 1987.
4. Harkinson, G., "Camping for All and All for Camping," *AMERIKA*, No 139, pp 1-7.
5. Polyanskiy, A., "Architecture and Leisure," *ARKHITEKTURA SSSR*, No 6, 1972, pp 3-19.
6. Bogusz, J., "Problems of Free Time of the Polish Youth in Light of Research," "Materialy k mezhdunarodnomu seminaru molodykh sotsiologov. Sochi, oktyabr 1987" [Materials on an International Seminar of Young Sociologists. Sochi, October 1987], Moscow, IS AN SSSR, 1989, pp 3-8 (mimeograph).

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya", 1990.

### The Protest Camp at Project 1212

915D0003H Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 90 (signed to  
press 6 Aug 90) pp 106-109

[Article by Olga Aleksandrovna Meleshkina, junior science associate at the Sociological Laboratory of Kuybyshev State University; Lidiya Mikhaylovna Polyantseva, scientific secretary at the Volga Division of the Soviet Architects' Union of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Vladimir Nikolayevich Rogachev, graduate student on the Chair of the Theory of Socialism and Sociology at

Kuybyshev State University; and Aleksey Aleksandrovich Frolov, sociologist at the Sociological Laboratory of Kuybyshev State University]

[Text] The residents of the town of Chapayevsk in Kuybyshev Oblast had learned in 1987 that a new plant would be built some 12 km from the town. There were rumors that the plant would be a light bulb manufacturer. If this were the case, it would not produce the problems of acid wastes and explosions like the other enterprises in Chapayevsk, it did not promise to poison the water and the air and so the construction of the "light bulb plant" was safely completed. Everything was ready for the start-up. However, from "hostile voices" particularly inquisitive persons learned that the new plant was a plant promised at the summit for destroying chemical weapons, the nation's first "Project 1212," as it was designated in the special documents. The danger of Project 1212 caused the debate with the presence of toxic substances in the densely settled Volga Region. The disputes over this went on for almost a year and ended with the establishing of a protest camp.

A protest camp is a new phenomenon for our country. The tent city on the Middle Volga has existed for over a month by the walls of the very powerful military installation ready for operation and is working for its restructuring.

The Trade Union Council of Kuybyshev Oblast and the Chapayevsk Informal Group Initiative have proposed that sociologists at Kuybyshev State University conduct a poll in the protest camp and this was carried out from 19 through 21 August 1989.

The protest camp at Project 1212 consisted of two connecting camps and both were set up a kilometer from the plant: at the entrance on the Chapayevsk side (4 August) and on the side of the settlement of Bezenchuk (from 12 August). During the days of the poll there were 46 tents in the first camp and 28 in the second. The number of persons living at the Chapayevsk camp changed from 40 to 80 on workdays and from 120 to 200 on days off; correspondingly in the Bezenchuk it was 20-50 and 70 persons. During the holding of demonstrations and meetings with the people's deputies, residents from surrounding towns and settlements came to the Chapayevsk camp and, for example, at the demonstration on 22 August around 5,000 persons assembled.

The poll was conducted by the method of a semiformalized interview and a total of 121 persons was questioned, virtually all the permanent "population" of the camp as well as those who had arrived for various times. It can be felt that the sample aggregate was sufficiently representative, since it almost equaled the total number of persons residing in the camp.

A majority of those questioned was inhabitants of Chapayevsk with 70 percent, residents of Kuybyshev were 12 percent, Bezenchuk 8 percent, Novokuybyshevsk 3 percent, while the remaining participants in the movement

were from the village of Pokrovka, Osinki, the settlement of Pribrezhnyy and the town of Saratov.

Men and women were approximately equal halves with 49 percent and 51 percent. All ages were represented: 33 percent under the age of 30, 35 percent from 30 to 45 and 32 percent over 45. Married persons comprised 47 percent and 65 percent had children. The problem of "where to leave the children" was solved in a dual manner: 35 percent of the movement participants took their children along to the protest camp and 35 percent left them home with some relative.

Contrary to expectations, it was discovered that a significant portion of the persons residing in the camp (58 percent) was employed at industrial enterprises. Some 21 percent of the respondents was employed in the nonindustrial sphere; pensioners were also 21 percent. Here among the pensioners, former workers and female kolkhoz members predominated. Of the working-age portion, workers were 57 percent, white collar personnel 11 percent and students were 11 percent.

For participating in the protest movement, 16.5 percent of the industrial workers went on paid leave to the camp keeping their average earnings (a decision of the STK [labor collective council]), 11 percent of the workers and white collar personnel received a paid leave, 22 percent had unpaid leave and 7 percent of those questioned were replaced by comrades on the job. The remainder during the period of stay in the camp did not work, that is, they had days off or absences and used their own vacations. Some 31 percent of those questioned lived permanently in the camp, 35 percent lived for several days, while 34 percent arrived for their days off.

The educational level of those in the camp was rather high: 61 percent of them had a secondary and specialized secondary education and 13 percent had a higher and incomplete higher education.

Contrary to the rumors that there were only members of the informal movements in the camp, only 15 percent of those questioned considered themselves as members of any informal associations, 12 percent was Komsomol members and 11 percent was communists.

Some of the first to come help equip the camp were the military guarding Project 1212. They sent a vehicle carrying wooden boxes and these were used for chairs as well as for firewood, and they supplied the camp with drinking water. Officers came to the protest camp and listened to speeches at the daily demonstrations. Anyone who so desired could go to the office of the commander of the troop unit and Project 1212 itself was also accessible as the military provided a bus for those who wanted to view the plant with their own eyes. However, it cannot be said that there was complete trust and calmness as in the camp there was a struggle of attitudes but to the honor of the military command there were no provocations of clashes, although grounds for this could have been found. At times, the demonstrations moved from the camp to the very checkpoint blocking the road



to the plant; it was said that one night the barrier bar was painted green by someone from the Green movement.

In the camp "iron discipline" was particularly noticeable and there was not a single instance of drunkenness and without exception everyone spoke of this with pride. As a whole, with the exception of the demonstrations, a peaceable atmosphere prevailed in the camp and not a single person refused to speak with the sociologist; they also spoke calmly, in the large part, with representatives

of the town authorities as well as the instructors of the CPSU Obkom who arrived during the last days.

All those questioned mentioned one thing as the reason for their presence in the protest camp and this was to prevent the opening of the plant for the destruction of chemical weapons and all 100 percent of those questioned came voluntarily to the camp. The reasons which caused the people to participate in this protest action are given in Table 1.

**Table 1: Reasons for Coming to Protest Camp**

Reason of Presence	Number	% of Persons Replying
To prevent opening of plant to destroy chemical weapons in densely inhabited region	121	100
In addition:		
A victory for this action was a step in the fight to solve other problems	1	0.8
The restructuring of the plant	12	9.9
Move the plant to an empty (uninhabited) zone	6	4.9
Protection of nature	16	13.2
Draw the attention of a governmental commission	4	3.3
Provide available help to the protest camp	2	1.6
Make a training ground here	1	0.8
Political solidarity of people (express solidarity)	9	7.4
Raise activeness of the people	5	4.1
Came to see and later report information to one's collective	2	1.6
Propaganda of social democratic ideas	1	0.8
Keep ideas to oneself	1	0.8

All of this was expressed in the slogans which were put up in the protest camp on special stands and which were used in the demonstrations in Chapayevsk, Kuybyshev and Moscow.

To the question "Are you hopeful that the protest camp will help resolve the conflict?" some 84 percent of the respondents replied affirmatively, 9 percent affirmatively under certain conditions and 7 percent negatively. Those who spoke about the conditions for achieving the purpose mentioned as one of these the providing of broader information about the camp and plant and which must be disseminated in the oblast and throughout the nation as a whole. A majority of the participants in the protest movement believed that the government would take a decision to restructure the plant and would not permit the further exacerbating of the conflict. This conclusion was confirmed by the attitude toward a strike as a means for pressuring the government; 87 percent of those questioned described a strike as an extreme measure of combat ("For now a strike is not advised. In taking the decision to open the plant it is essential to employ all measures for a strike. But a strike itself in Chapayevsk could cause excesses. Worker militias must be organized, they must be instructed as police, and thought must be given to what types of products would be involved in a strike with the

least harm to the state and the labor collective." "If they do not agree, then there will be a strike. At present, this must not be done and possibly the commission will reconsider. There would be great harm from a strike. This is an extreme measure." "A strike is an extreme but things must not be taken to the extreme"). Some 11 percent of the respondents were against a strike under any conditions. Here 20 percent of the respondents emphasized the need for preparing and organizing a strike and only 7 percent (basically the elderly and women) favored a strike "right now."

In the opinion of all of those who recognized a strike as a possible extreme measure for expressing the protest, the signal for this would be the decision to open up the plant. This was briefly formulated in one of the slogans: "The opening of the plant and a universal oblast strike!" One must also note the serious attitude toward the strike amongst the most radically inclined workers. Some called for a 2-hour solidarity strike as a fight measure where the complete halting of production could create the threat of an accident.

To the question of "Whom do you consider the leader in the camp and why?" the answers were distributed as follows: 22 percent the aktiv of the camp, 22 percent "Each person himself is a leader" ("There is no general

leader in the camp. There are two groupings of 'alternative' and the rest. The members of the informal groups do not have any particular support"), Initiative (Chapayevsk) with 20 percent and Alternative (Kuybyshev) with 20 percent. Of all those questioned, the Chapayevsk CPSU Gorkom was called the leader by just three persons (2.5 percent) and no one mentioned the Chapayevsk Komsomol Gorkom.

For the participants in the protest, the attitude toward the leading bodies was expressed in a positive or negative assessment. Very many found it hard to say anything about the concrete work of the leading bodies to resolve the conflict and help the protest camp. The distribution of answers to the question "How do you view the position of the following leading bodies in this conflict?" is shown in Table 2. The Gorispolkom and the CPSU Gorkom in the town of Chapayevsk gained the largest number of affirmative replies with 29.7 percent.

Table 2: Attitude Toward Leading Bodies

Versions of Answers	Gorispolkom and CPSU Gorkom (Chapayevsk)	Executive Committee and Party Committees at Place of Residence (Except Chapayevsk)	CPSU Obkom and Oblispolkom	Oblast Trade Union
Positive	29.7	10.0	15.6	17.4
Negative	21.5	5.7	32.2	7.4
Hard to answer	38.8	84.3	52.1	74.2

At the beginning of September 1989, a governmental commission arrived in Kuybyshev and Chapayevsk and the protest movement wanted to influence its decision. The commission took the decision to request that the USSR Council of Ministers restructure the experimental industrial project for destroying nuclear weapons as a training center for personnel of future large-scale industrial enterprises in this sector. The commission's act provided that here training would be carried out only on "simulation devices," that there would be no real toxins at the plant and that the observance of the decisions would be monitored by the public. However, after the completion of the work by the governmental commission, the protest camp continued to exist. Spontaneous mistrust, the expectation of deception and caution were the main things in the public opinion of the people. They left the protest camp only after the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, N.I. Ryzhkov, recognized the commission's conclusions to be valid and this was announced in the mass information media.

Undoubtedly, the protest camp is a new form for the Soviet Union of the expression of the public will and for informing the state bodies of public attitudes, expectations and demands. The discussion which developed in the Volga Region over the question of the safety or

danger of Project 1212 and the protest camp itself as its logical conclusion served as a factor in politicizing the conscience of the public. Such a form of expressing public opinion was created on the basis of the voluntariness, initiative and spontaneous organization of the people. It served as a shock absorber for the spontaneous radicalism of the demands and made it possible to shift the conflict into socially acceptable limits.

The Chapayevsk protest camp was an unique channel for the intense contacts among the people. Workers and "informals," pensioners, representatives of the party apparatus and the municipal authorities met personally with one another, without "barriers," and without pressure from the mass information media. In these brief conclusions, let us mention once again that in the given experience of the first protest camp in the USSR it was possible to avoid social clashes and victims.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Sotsiologicheskoye issledovaniya", 1990.

### Waiting for Work at Home

915D0003J Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSEDOVANIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 90 (signed to  
press 6 Aug 90) pp 110-111

[Article by Suyekle Galeevna Ibragimova, sociologist at the Miloserdie Plant (Ufa). This is the first time she appears in our journal]

[Text] At the Bashkir Scientific-Production Association imeni S.M. Kirov for 2 years now, there has been the Miloserdie [Charity] Plant for work at home. The basic contingent of home-workers is comprised of women raising small children, pensioners, disabled persons in groups I and II, pregnant women, mothers with large families, single mothers and women raising disabled children. Among the 300 plant workers, 15 percent is disabled persons and 14 percent is pensioners. For the home-workers there is an incomplete workday, increased rates and a bonus (30 percent) for the amount of work performed and 15 percent for the regional coefficient. The operations are simple and manual. The work is delivered to the home and picked up in the plant minibuses. Copiers, coil winders and assemblers provide delivery themselves. Pregnant women employed in heavy and hazardous jobs, upon the statement of a physician, can be switched to work at home with a wage at the average rate. This excludes traveling on transport during the peak hours.

The plant management personnel includes a director, an engineer for production training, foreman, economist, timekeeper, sociologists and dispatchers.

In the spring of 1990, a questionnaire poll of the home-workers was conducted. The average age of those questioned was 35 years and the average wage was 135-140 rubles. We studied the satisfaction with the home form of organizing labor, its positive and negative aspects. We

were also interested in the question of "Does a home-worker feel more protected on the social level than prior to working at the Miloserdie Plant?"

Work at home provided an opportunity for a certain category of the population to feel an increased level of their social security. Thus, women with large families, women with small children are often not desired in production. Pensioners and disabled persons in group III are hard to find jobs while disabled persons in groups I and II are considered unemployable. On the job there are no special facilities for their work. A legless person in a wheelchair cannot always even leave his home, he cannot get on urban transport, he cannot pass through the plant entry, he cannot work at a machine tool and so forth. Disabled persons who have undergone severe operations require individual treatment and they also are unable to work in production. This list could be continued.

During the year, the number of persons requesting a job at the plant providing work at home rose by scores of fold. New labor resources were discovered which are virtually unemployed. The poll disclosed that the reason for going to work was the desire to improve the material situation and gain a stable wage. This was indicated by all pensioners, 42 percent of the women with small children and 36 percent of the disabled. Other reasons included fear of interrupting the period of continuous employment (mothers with small children); the hope of gaining a sense to life and finding some employment (disabled). Among the mothers, one out of every three switched to work at home due to the lack of places in the creches, and 27 percent were unable to work in production since they were raising disabled children or enfeebled children who could not attend the nurseries and creches. However, work at home is not the best method for the social protection of the mother. As the poll showed, a majority of mothers worked to the detriment of their health at night. This is a temporary measure and for now the question has not been resolved of paying for maternity as a type of labor activity in raising future citizens.

Many home-workers (69 percent) like this form of labor activity. The mothers felt that their children were sick less often. They now can give more attention to the family and their husband. We propose that work at home helps to solve a whole series of problems in raising a healthy generation and strengthening family ties. But can this reduce drunkenness?

Employed disabled persons, in addition to improving their material status, point out that they could see "light through the window." What does a person do in a wheelchair locked in his apartment all day? Work aroused his interest in life and a feeling to be involved in a common undertaking. The disabled pointed out that their mood improved. We would point out that psychological support for home-workers is part of the duties of the sociologist and foremen at the Miloserdie Plant.

One other positive aspect in work at home is the increased time for watching television and listening to radio. This raises the cultural level of the individual. In addition, 17 percent of the mothers pointed out that there was an opportunity to introduce the children to socially useful labor.

Some 1.4 percent of those questioned was not satisfied by the home form of organizing labor and it was not completely to the liking of 9.7 percent. Among the reasons for dissatisfaction were the low wage rates and the unreliable delivery and pick-up of the work. Some 15 percent felt that they had less contact with others. There were no complaints of the physical severity of the work, poorer relations in the family or impoliteness of the servicing personnel. The home-workers proposed compensating for the designated lack of contact by joint leisure. Preference was given to children's holidays and nature trips. Only 17 percent of the respondents mentioned recreational evenings and 6 percent meetings.

Work at home at the Miloserdie Plant quickly became popular and even prestigious. Due to the large number of persons seeking employment, the question arose: "Was there not a fear of losing their work at home?" At times, such a notion did appear for 30 percent of those questioned and 20 percent feared remaining without work. It is essential to broaden the network of shops for work at home in order to exclude latent unemployment for persons who are actually employable but who cannot work under permanent production conditions. The small Miloserdie Plant is unable to provide employment for all those so desiring in the city of a million persons. This problem is far from a regional one.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya", 1990.

#### Articles Not Translated

00000000 Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 9, Sept 90 (signed to  
press 6 Aug 90)

The Scientific Organization of Production and the Logic of Perestroika in the USSR (V.I. Bakulin) (pp 3-13)

On the Tasks of a Generalizing Social Science (S.L. Frank) (pp 30-49)

Sociological Realism and the Problem of the Ontological Basis of Social Science (Editorial Roundtable) (V.I. Shamshurin) (pp 49-59)

The Soviet-Bulgarian Family in the Komi ASSR (From the Data of Ethnosociological Research) (Zh. Genova, O.V. Kotov, M.B. Rogachev, Yu.P. Shabayev) (pp 79-83)

A Document Reflecting the Era (P.A. Plyutto) (pp 112-113)

For the Proletkult Congress (N. Bukharin) (pp 113-115)



An Open Letter to Comrade Bukharin (A. Bogdanov) (pp 115-117)

"Auxiliary Theories of Measurement" in American Empirical Sociology (I.F. Devyatko) (pp 118-126)

Letter to the Editor: Tell the People the Truth (A.V. Rumme) (pp 127-129)

Become Acquainted With New Members of the Editorial Collegium (Unattributed) (p 130)

"Sometime We Will Remember This and It Will Not Be Believed Itself...." (L.A. Radzikhovskiy) (pp 131-138)

On Foreign Concepts of Socialism (Yu.A. Demchenko, O.V. Illarionov, I.Ye. Zadorozhnyuk) (pp 138-154)

The Sociologist's Bookshelf (Unattributed) (pp 129, 155)

Table of Contents in English (Unattributed) (p 158)

**Publication Data**

915D0003L Moscow *SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA* in Russian No 9, Sept 90 (signed to press 6 Aug 90) p 160

English title: **SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES**

Russian title: **SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA**

Editor: A.V. Dmitriyev

Publishing house: Nauka

Place of publication: Moscow

Date of publication: September 1990

Signed to press: 6 August 1990

Copies: 19,782

**COPYRIGHT:** Izdatelstvo "Nauka", "Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya", 1990.

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

11 Feb. 1991